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ABSTRACT 
 
AL-MOSLEMANI, SHAIKHA Masters: June: 2018, Gulf Studies 
Title: GCC Perception of Threats from Iraq and Iran: Explaining the Enduring Alliance 
with the United States 
Supervisor of Thesis: Mahjoob, Zweiri 
Threat perception in international relations plays a major role in forming 
international alliances. Previously Iraq and nowadays Iran, has an essential role in 
impacting the security concerns of the GCC. Therefore, this thesis will provide an adequate 
answer to the question: to what extent do Iraq and Iran threaten the stability of Gulf 
Cooperation Council states, and how have these states reacted in pursuit of their protection.  
 
This study aims to test the accuracy of GCC governments’ perceptions regarding 
Iraq and Iran via the four elements of threats state possess highlighted in Stephen Walt’s 
The Origins of Alliance.  By refereeing to several literatures across several time frames in 
the 20th century, this thesis argues that the behavior of Iran and Iraq in the Gulf have been 
destabilizing to the security of the GCC states. Hence, Iraq and Iran represents a danger to 
regional stability which means that GCC states, in a simple Neorealist logic, cannot rely 
on them for their security, and hence requesting support from the United States (an extra-
regional power).  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
This chapter will present a general overview of the topic of the research, and 
consists of three sections. The first section identifies the problem statement that clarifies 
the case study, dividing it into what is the problem, when and why it occurred in addition 
to its implications on contemporary Gulf politics. Then, it examines the literature review, 
which begins by exploring theories of alliances. The literature then examines the period of 
1979, after the overthrow of the Shah’s regime following the two regional events of Iraq-
Iran war in 1980 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Further, it illustrates the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its regional implications with a focus on Iraq, Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia. Finally, it concludes with Iran’s intervention in the Arab Spring with a 
special examination of the Middle East Civil Wars in Syria and Yemen.   
 
The second section demonstrates the research objective followed by the research 
question. Moreover, it discusses the research design which describes how the researcher 
will conduct research and obtain the data, including a discussion of some of the challenges 
facing data collection. The last section clarifies the structure of the thesis.  
 
1.1 Research problem 
 
This research is important to understand the sources of GCC states’ enduring 
alliance with the United States, as well as the nature of political relations between three 
regional axes Iraq, Iran and the GCC.  The study attempts to provide an answer to the 
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following question: how have GCC states perceived of Iran since the Islamic Revolution 
in 1979; and how have then perceived of Iraq since its invasion of Kuwait in 1990? What 
sorts of threats do GCC states see in Iran and Iraq to the Gulf region? GCC states perceived 
Iran and Iraq as major threats to the stability and security of the region. The political 
behavior of these two countries (especially in the late 1970s and in the 1990s – and since) 
led to a breach of trust which caused concern in the Gulf region. As a result, the Gulf States 
were compelled to deepen an existing alliance with the United States (an extra-regional 
power) to obtain protection. In the two regional wars, Iraq was the primary aggressor. It 
began by attacking Iran in 1980 and then by invading its supporter against Iran, Kuwait in 
1990. Accordingly, Iraq was regarded as the source of danger due to the regime’s 
aggressive political behavior. 
 
 However, the fall of Saddam Hussain, Iraq’s leader, in 2003 by the United States, 
succeeded in changing the balance of threat in the region. Therefore, Iraq then barely 
observed as a threat, whereas Iran arrived as a serious regional major threat. The 
involvement of Iran as a proxy in the Syrian and Yemeni civil war formed a security gap 
for the Gulf States, in which an Arab-Gulf coalition was formed to fight the Houthi rebels 
and their ally “Iran” in Yemen. Further, the involvement of GCC, particularly Saudi Arabia 
in Syria intersected with Iran acting in Syria as part of its regional ambitions.  
 
  All of these regional threats affected the stability of the Gulf region. The two axes 
of threat Iran and Iraq possess a strategic geographical location to the Arabian Gulf, making 
them actual enemies for the long term. As a consequence, the GCC states are obliged to 
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seek solutions that enable them to deter and contain threats themselves, rather than 
depending on external powers for protection. Hence, these issues must be solved in the 
short term to avoid future unexpected consequences because once the danger reaches its 
peak, it will not be easy to cope with. This is clearly accruing in the region where Saudi 
Arabia and its Gulf allies are incapable of dealing with Iran. 
 
1.2 Literature review 
 
The following section briefly reviews the alliance literature to understand its main 
weaknesses and strengths; this will help provide a backdrop to explaining the choices of 
allies for GCC states, which they sought in order to protect them. Moreover, it also reviews 
critical events that shaped regional relations in the Gulf. The aim of this review is to provide 
a coherent understanding of the nature of threat and its transformation through time, in 
addition to understand the alliances formation in the region.  
 
1.3 Theoretical approaches explaining alliance choices 
 
Alliances mean different levels of state commitments; yet they remain a vital tie 
between states aiming to maintain and enhance their survival and security. Several theorists 
provided definitions for alliance; from a realist perspective, Morgenthau (1959) defines 
alliance as a function of balancing power which operates in multiple states’ system (p.185). 
According to Morgenthau, three requirements must be considered in establishing alliance. 
First, alliance could enhance power of the allied states by adding the power of other states 
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to the alliance. Second, states could boost their power through arming each other and third, 
allied states are capable of revoking opponent’s power by pulling the power of other states 
(Shekri, 1978.p.12). Stephan Walt (1987) identified alliance as security cooperation among 
two or more states in the shape of formal or informal cooperation (p.1). Since alliances 
targeted wars, their aim is to avoid waging wars, or later, to defeat opponents. 
 
The literature sees alliances to take different forms. The regional alliance is the 
fastest type of alliance where regional states form regional alliance with each other to 
accelerate the aim of security and stability. Kostiner (1998) argued the GCC founded the 
Gulf Cooperation Council as an Arab coalition to defend their nations against regional 
external threats during the Iraq-Iran war (p.55). Salim (2015, 74) explained international 
alliance by examining the US initiative of the international coalition in 1990 to provide 
support to its GCC allies to deter the Iraqi’s threat and to pull the forces out of Kuwait to 
liberate Kuwait because of an existing military alliance. 
 
However, the most powerful form of alliance is the military alliance. Singer and 
Small (1969) classified three types of military alliance. First is entente in which states seek 
permission of one another in terms of military intervention. Second, neutrality or non-
aggression means states pledge not to perform military actions against any member of the 
alliance. Lastly, the defense pact where a state is capable of interfering on behalf of other 
allied state (p.270-271).  The best example to illustrate this convention is the Saudi 
coalition in Yemen with the participation of several GCC, Arabs and Western States. A 
military alliance must be enhanced in order to deter threats. In a seminar by the Department 
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of International affairs at Qatar University in March 2018, Major General Mohammed Al-
Marri discussed the benefits of alliance. For small states, military alliance maintains its 
security and stability in addition to promoting trust relations with the powerful states. In 
turn, the alliances with small states enhance the influence of the external ally (such as the 
United States) in the region.  
 
1.4 Evaluating the study of alliances 
 
Most of the literature on alliances derives from an understanding that distribution 
of capabilities influence alliance decisions. Moreover, the literature largely agrees that 
small states have limited options, given their relative capabilities, and are constantly in 
search of allies to help secure them. The reason for choosing a coalition is often survival; 
however, the coalition drains resources of weaker state via using these resources by strong 
state.  
 
1.5 Main events which shaped contemporary Gulf politics 
 
Iraq and Iran were perceived by GCC states as major regional powers that threaten 
the security of the Arabian Gulf. GCC security concerns are based on regional events that 
occurred in the period between 1980 and 2015. Each event was associated with either Iran 
or Iraq; in the case of Iraq, the aggressive regime of Saddam Hussain and his Ba’th party 
was a nightmare for Iran and the Gulf region whereas the outbreak of the Iranian revolution 
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alarmed the Gulf monarchs. Further, the crisis of Yemen in 2015 forced Saudi Arabia and 
its Gulf neighbors to form a coalition against the Houthi rebels, the Iranian proxy. 
 
During the reign of the Iranian Shah, securing Iran from several external threats 
including Iraq and the Soviet Union was the top priority. Maqsud Nuri (1986) argues that 
the factor of oil played a significant role in the Iranian economy due to three concerns. 
First, Iran occupied the fourth place in oil reserves behind Federal Russia, Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia. Second, Iran was positioned as the fourth biggest producer of oil in addition 
to being the only country that imported and exported oil simultaneously. Moreover, the 
Strait of Hormuz was the only source to ship the Iranian oil tankers. However, Nuri (1986) 
argues that the political factor had a profound impact on the Shah because of his perception 
of Iraq as a threat due to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1973. Furthermore, Iraq and the 
Soviet Union were super powers and shared solid ties which could lead, if they desired, to 
the demolishment of Iran.  
  
1.6 Iran and Iraq literature 1971-1988 
 
Iran was viewed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a source of threat that 
destabilizes the internal security of the seven federations. In a foreign policy analysis study 
by Rugh (1996), he argued that the issue of UAE islands caused tension in the bilateral 
relations between Iran and UAE. Rugh examined the claims by both states regarding the 
possession of the islands in which both states related their claims to historical facts. 
Moreover, the study discussed that the Iranian behavior regarding the islands is a threat to 
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GCC neighbors because Iran had regional ambitions. He concluded in the idea that the 
occupation of the islands served Iran’s political aims related to imposing its regional 
hegemony and expansion Rugh( 1996).  
  
The danger and the aggressiveness of the Iraqi regime was a nightmare for both the 
Gulf States and Iran. The first Gulf war among Iraq and Iran was initiated by the former 
Iraqi president Saddam Hussain, the main actor that destabilized regional peace. According 
to Ramazani (1985), he assumed that “the major regional conflict in the Gulf region was 
Iraq-Iran war” (p.96). Likewise, Ramazani acknowledged that Iran and Iraq always have a 
presence in the Gulf affairs due to their geographical proximity, and their war resulted in 
reinforcing the competition between the major powers alongside security concerns.  As a 
result, Kundi (1989) explains the Iraqi-Iranian war “obliged the Gulf states to engage in 
security integration” (p.94). Hence, the creation of a regional association, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council, happened during the war in 1980 with the inclusion of the six 
permanent countries of the GCC: Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia plus United 
Arab Emirates. However, Iraq was excluded as the adequate solution to secure the region 
through a joint defense (Kundi, 1989.p.93).  
 
Iraq was willing to regain its lost regional position after its struggle in its war with 
Iran. Hence, its invasion of Kuwait was justified via political and economic excuses despite 
Kuwaiti support provided to Saddam Hussain during the eight year war. Politically, 
Schaeffer (2005) examined that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was connected with Saddam’s 
intention to restore his hegemony after his war with Iran. He stated that the invasion would 
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permit Saddam to occupy a specific percentage of world oil revenue, estimated around 
25%, in addition to increasing his sovereignty (20%) of Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries, which would assist Saddam to achieve the objective of becoming a 
major power in the Gulf (p.266). In terms of economics, Dijk (2008) argued the economic 
status of Iraq after the war led to the escalation of tension with the Gulf, particularly with 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as both countries rejected financial assistance for Iraq. Iraq 
requested Kuwait and Saudi to forgive the $50 billion USD that was given as a debt during 
the war, alongside the Iraqi claims that Kuwait was accountable for the decline of oil prices 
in late of 1980 (Dijk, 2008). 
 
1.7 Literature on Iran after 2003 until the aftermath of Arab Spring 
 
The hegemony of Iran began to rise soon after the fall of Baghdad, it attempted to 
maintain its control on the Gulf and the Arab region. As a result, numerous consequences 
took effect immediately after the removal of the previous Iraqi regime. Iran’s intention of 
intervention in the domestic affairs of Iraq is to attain political objectives. Milani (2012), a 
foreign policy analyst and political scientist in his speech in a conference titled “Iran, Iraq 
and the Gulf Cooperation Council: New Realities in Persian Gulf Security,” confirmed the 
Iranian aim in Iraq is the desire to set up a new government governed by the Shia to impose 
a powerful cohesion with the lack of power to form a threat. Further, Milani (2012) 
believed that Iran has managed to accomplish its target to extend its hegemony by filling 
the security gap in Iraq after the war.  
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Yafee and Hisbani asserted that the United States is the main element in preserving 
the security and stability of the Gulf region. According to Yafee (2004) the U.S is interested 
in the possibility of forming a dual cooperative alliance in order to overcome the challenges 
that threaten the Gulf monarchs. Additionally, Yafee states that this cooperation is essential 
for their bilateral ties with the United States (p.124). Thus, Hisbani (2005) mentioned that 
the intention of United States through its bases in certain Gulf countries and its deployment 
of a large number of rotational troops is to block any attempt of any country to become 
regionally dominant. 
 
Both Shanahan and Kazemi agree on the concept of the animosity between Iran and 
the US, and vice versa.  Shanahan in his study (2009) clarifies the Iranian anxiety 
concerning the U.S bases in the Gulf, describing the nervousness of Iran as an “anathema” 
due to the Iranian perception of these bases as a threat to its national stability in addition to 
the fact that the U.S might impose limitation on Tehran’s military (p.8). Moreover 
Shanahan assumes the former Iranian president Ahmadinejad demanded a regional alliance 
between Iran and the Gulf States under a certain condition that eliminated the U.S 
involvement. Yet, the Gulf States were not willing to accept this alliance (Shanahan, 2009. 
p.8). In contrast, Kazemi (2014) concludes that prior to 2003; the only sources of threats 
in the Middle East were the Iraqi and the Iranian regimes. However, the equation changed 
after the U.S invasion on Iraq in 2003 which led Iran to be the only country in the chess 
game that defies the U.S existence in the Gulf (p.7).  
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Piven’s article in Al-Jazeera online (2012) used specific statistical data regarding 
Iran’s military capabilities. Iran has around 523,000 personnel in active services that 
involves 350,000 soldiers and includes 220,000 conscripts among the soldiers. Despite this, 
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps represented the major important army in 
comparison to the rest of the Iranian military. For instance, its soldiers are estimated to be 
125,000 soldiers in addition to its huge potentials of naval and defense forces compromised 
of 18,000 and 12,000 respectively (Piven, 2012).  
 
In contrast, the military aspect of the Gulf States is incomparable in terms of its size 
with the Iranian and Iraqi military. Kundi (1989) described the size of Gulf military as 
small, yet, it endeavored to advance and progress its military capabilities to be able to 
defeat any conceivable threats. For instance, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia managed to develop 
its armed forces such as the Royal Saudi Army in addition to King Fahad Military City, 
located near Kuwait; this is defined as the most substantial base in the Gulf to put off 
Iranian’s threats (p.98).  
 
The overthrow of the Sunni regime in Baghdad contributed to the increase of Iran’s 
threat to Iraq and the GCC. In a report by Ayub (2013), the American invasion on Iraq 
resulted in facilitating the space for Shiite groups in Iraq to reach power. In addition, it led 
to an increase in Iranian-Saudi tensions in what has been called a cold war, which resulted 
in fighting each other through proxies in Syria and Yemen according to Ayub (2013). 
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Iran supported the project of Arab Spring that began in 2010 under the pretext of 
Islamic Awakening, a theory similar to that of its Islamic Revolution. Iran’s direct 
intervention in Syrian civil war started in 2013; Kozak (2017) examined the Iranian 
military intervention. Kozak provided a statistical data regarding the estimated number of 
fighters in Syria, concluding that around 30,000 Iranian fighters divided between the IRGC, 
Shiite militia and Lebanese Hezbollah fought in support of the regime (2017). He also, 
explained the role played by Iran in establishing military operations to maintain Al-Assad 
regime in several Syrian cities such as Aleppo, Latakia and Dera. Kozak, finally stated that 
Iran inserted itself heavily in the Syrian conflict so much so that even the Syrian regime 
cannot separate itself away from Iran because the latter is not willing to put an end to the 
conflict. Similarly, Zweiri (2011) discussed in his article, “Iranian-Syrian relations and the 
Syrian popular mobility”, the motives of Iran’s adherence and loyalty to Al-Assad regime 
and its attempt to maintain his power. Zweiri argued that Iran considered the events in Syria 
as plot targeting both states. Moreover, he provided Iran’s point of view of the Syrian 
regime where it is not despotic, yet it requires a reform.  
  
The rivalry among Saudi Arabia and Iran plays an essential role in their intervention 
in Yemen. Juneau (2016) argued that Iran demands to obtain entrée to certain states where 
their geographical location is important to Iran in order to oppose its rivalry in the region, 
Saudi Arabia. In addition he stated that the Houthi rebels are a proxy of Iran from the 
perspective of Saudi and thus, the Kingdom decided to initiate a coalition to restore the 
legitimacy of the Yemeni government and roll back the Houthis.  Furthermore, Zweiri 
(2016) examined the ancient intervention of Iran and Saudi Arabia in Yemen’s domestic 
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affairs in his study “Iran and political dynamics in the Arab world: the case of Yemen”. 
Zweiri stated that Iran perceived Saudi’s military involvement in Yemen as destabilizing 
the security of the region, while Saudi observed Iran’s technique of filling the region state’s 
power vacuum is ended (p.15-16). 
  
1.8 Evaluation of the literature  
 
The presented literatures illustrate the threat observed by the GCC from four 
consecutive decades since 1979. The literature demonstrated that Iran was, and is still, a 
major concern for the Gulf region and it’s the initial factor in creating permanent regional 
tension since the emergence of the Islamic Republic. The recent studies of Arab Spring 
confirmed Iran’s long term intentions and its successful attempts in dominating 
neighboring state e.g. Iraq and other Arab State e.g. Syria. Indeed, it demanded to 
implement the same strategy in Yemen via its confrontation with Saudi Arabia. However, 
Iran has not always been a source of threat to smaller Gulf States. To the contrary, smaller 
states with lesser capabilities, such as Saudi Arabia, have allied with Iran during the 1970s 
in the so-called “twin pillar” arrangement brokered by the United States at the time.  At the 
time, as well, the United Arab Emirates was threatened by Iran after the latter’s occupation 
of three islands in 1971. Therefore, states perceive the need to act against others when they 
see them as threatening; this also means that states do not see threat uniformly.  A lack of 
threat comparison studies focusing on the period of the Shah Mohammad Pahlavi, and 
Iran’s modern history impacted the researcher’s study plan. The researcher elected to 
investigate which period presented a greater threat to the Gulf region using comparison 
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studies. Lastly, the available literature on Arab Spring, the case of Syria emphasized on the 
role played by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The researcher tried to seek a detailed study 
concerning the amount of financial aids provided by Saudi to Syria, yet, the studies were 
very broad and mainly discussed GCC Humanitarian aid. In terms of Iran’s occupation to 
the three Emiratis Islands, the majority of the literature analyzed Iran’s threat to UAE in 
the economic field. However, there were unexposed studies focusing on Iran’s political 
threat to UAE. 
 
1.9 Research objective 
 
This study aims to assess the historical events that shaped and transformed Iraq and 
Iran into sources of regional threats perceived by the GCC States. It will explore how the 
political factors contributed to increase GCC concern during the phase of the three Gulf 
wars that resulted in changing the dynamics of balancing alliance followed by the decisions 
of Balancing and Bandwagon initiated by the GCC. The study will explore the historical 
roots of the Iranian occupation of the three Emirati islands and its economic consequences 
on the Strait of Hurmuz. Furthermore, it will examine the role of United States to defend 
its GCC allies against Iraq’s invasion in 1990, and how the GCC reshaped its assumptions 
regarding Iraq in addition to the involvement of Iran in Iraq in terms of its internal politics. 
Lastly, it will present the role played by Iran in the Arab conflicts with a focus on Syria 
and Yemen as Iran has a direct political and military intervention role, and will analyze 
whether or not Iran and Saudi Arabia intervention serves a political agenda. 
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 1.10 Research question 
 
The researcher aims to answer the following question: 
Q: How the dangers of Iraq and Iran threaten the stability of the Gulf countries and in what 
ways the Gulf perceives both states as the main threats to the regional stability? 
In addition, the thesis aims to provide clear answer to the following sub-question: 
Q: why does Saudi Arabia have intentions which “conflict” with Iran, in contrast to other 
Gulf countries? Does this Saudi Arabian political position vis-à-vis Iran serve Riyadh’s 
political agenda to become the dominate power in the region? 
 
 
1.11 Research design  
 
The researcher adapted a qualitative design “case study” in order to provide 
coherence and an appropriate answer for the research question because the question of the 
study opens by “how,” which enables the researcher to gain sufficient results as one would 
consider the theme of cause and effect in analyzing the data.  The researcher studied certain 
Gulf countries focusing on Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates, to understand 
the different dimensions of the issue. 
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The data was collected through two techniques. First, the major data was obtained 
via primary sources consisting of online published interviews .These included interviews 
with several decision makers of the Gulf States, in particular from Qatar. The decision 
makers were the Minister of State of Qatar for Defense Khalid Al-Attia by the news agency 
Sputnik news in addition to the Former Prime Minister of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim 
Al-Thani interview published by a YouTube channel Brkaq8. Further, statements 
declaration by Arab decision makers e.g. Tarek Aziz in a book were used in the next 
chapters. Lastly, the statistical data and percentages were selected from economic reports 
and certain Academia articles. 
 
 The second technique is the secondary data which often is collected via printed 
books, academic journal articles ,previous studies published by researchers in the same 
field, articles of newspaper and magazines, online resources e.g. online libraries, Google 
scholar , in addition to online news channels and video documentary. These were used to 
support the main data. The researcher mainly depended on Arabic and English resources; 
however few Iranian and Turkish articles were used to present alternative perspectives. 
Moreover, the researcher used several online books in addition to databases to gather the 
literature. Most used resources were J Store database and Qatar University Library.  
 
Finally, analyzing the data was implemented via the technique of thematic approach 
since the study of the researcher is divided into various themes and time framework. The 
researcher faced several limitations working on this study. The inability of the researcher 
to conduct interviews with scholars from the GCC countries that the study examined was 
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due to the recent crisis between Qatar and several GCC States which are: United Arab 
Emirates, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. In addition, there was a lack of direct resources 
regarding the statistical data of the Saudi’s funding to the rebels in Yemen and Syria; the 
literature is largely thematic or generalized and not detailed. Lastly, the lack of research 
papers applying Walt’s (1987) Threat Perception Theory on the GCC and the Middle East.  
 
In terms of future research, it’s recommended to employ mixed methods, 
“Quantitative and Qualitative,” to provide a coherent comparison since Quantitative 
methods would seek to understand individual’s observation in the GCC societies via 
questionnaires. Moreover, interviews with scholars from UAE and Saudi Arabia to 
strengthen the research should be conducted. Due to the recent crisis in the GCC, it was 
challenging to accesses the decision makers in UAE and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the study 
depended on the literature to support the thesis’s argument. Lastly,   it is suggested that a 
translation of the important Iranian studies on the Gulf issues should be used to tolerate 
future researchers to understand the opponent point of view. 
 
 
1.12 Structure of the Research 
 
This study is consisted of a total of six chapters. Chapter one provides an overview 
of the literature, research objectives, research question, and methodology of the research. 
Chapter two illustrates the main theoretical approach of the study, terms definitions in 
addition to examine the criticism of the theoretical framework by other scholars. Then, 
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Chapter three is divided into two sections. The first section clarifies the issue of Iran’s 
occupation to the three Emirati islands and its consequences on the GCC stability. The 
second section discusses the surrounded danger facing the Gulf during Iraq-Iran war. The 
fourth chapter demonstrates the Iraqi’s threat towards Kuwait in particular and the Gulf 
States in 1990 and the intentions led to the outbreak of invasion. Moreover, the chapter 
examines the emergence of Iran in Iraq after the US invasion on Iraq in 2003 that resulted 
in the removal of Saddam’s Hussain regime. Chapter five looks at Iran’s intervention in 
the case of Arab Spring, beginning with Bahrain uprising in 2011 and concluding chaos 
took place between Iran and Saudi Arabia after the execution of the Saudi Shiite cleric 
Nimr Al-Nimr. Finally, the chapter ends by examining the role of Iran in Syria and Yemen. 
The last chapter elucidates the conclusion remarks.  
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Chapter 2: THEORITICAL FRAMEOWRK FOR UNDERSTANDING 
THREAT PERCEPTION  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the theory 
of how threat perceptions influence alliance decisions proposed by Stephen Walt in his 
book “Origins of Alliances”. In this chapter, certain concepts associated with the theory 
will be examined. Before analyzing the theory, the terms of power and threat will be 
identified. Then the researcher will define and explain the differences between balancing 
and bandwagoning among states with great powers and regional states. Second, the 
researcher will clarify upon what conditions and circumstances a state decides to either 
balance or bandwagon and to what extent a state perceives a particular regional state as a 
source of danger. The third question to be examined is what is the most accurate choice for 
regional states to choose in order to maintain their domestic and regional security alongside 
with the presence of a regional force that threatens their peace? Further, the chapter will 
examine the subjected criticism of Walt’s theory by academic scholars in the field of 
International politics.  
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This theory is important to understand the nature of threats and the choice of 
alliance in the Middle East and to what extent the factor of geographical proximity 
contributes to increase threat. In addition, it examines the state’s utilization of its 
capabilities and intentions to achieve its current and future ambitions. The theory clarifies 
the intentions of a state’s decision to participate in alliance to preserve its security, the 
fateful decision that forces states to provide support to the powerful and threatening states 
despite their unwillingness and to what extent the intentions may change to the 
disadvantage of the supported states e.g. the changing status of Iraq towards its Gulf 
neighbors after the war with Iran. 
 
2.2 Threat Perception as an explanation of alliance decisions  
 
  Before discussing Walt’s theory, the following part will be a brief discussion of the 
nature of power in political spheres.  In international relations, power and threat are the 
main components of conflicts which occur between states or groups. These components 
determine the extent of danger; wither it’s a direct threat e.g. economic threat, military 
threat, wars…etc?  or an indirect threat such as identity and cultural threat? According to 
Gelb, power is described as the Platinum coin in which the potential of achieving goals 
remains imaginable either with low power or when no power exists (Gelb, 2009.p. 26). In 
politics, power is described as a country or a government that is under a certain political 
domain (Longman, 2004.p.701).  As an example, the political system of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is governed by a theocratic1 system after the revolution of 1979. 
Moreover, the power of the theocratic system in Iran plays a significant role because Iran 
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is the only state in the world that implements theocracy in governing the state.  
 
Power is an essential tool in global politics because with power a state can fulfill a 
strategic position that could create terror for other neighboring states. Moreover, through 
exercising power it can enhance its global image among the world powerful states even if 
the power has been used in a destructive manner. Yet, if a state lacks of power, it would 
lead to its transformation into a marginalized and weak state that has no right for a political 
participation due to the unwillingness of the strong states to establish ties with a weaker 
partner. Therefore, weaker states become servants to stronger and threatening states that 
enable them to exhaust the state’s resources in order to gain protection. However, this 
contradicts the assumptions of Walt which will be discussed later in the chapter.  
 
The definition of threat in the following two definitions shared one common 
concept that is “harm” According to Dwivedi, threat is a result of perceptional thought 
instead of thematic phenomena. Two elements determine the level of threat which are the 
intentions of the state and its abilities (Dwivedi, 2012. P.225). The abilities consisted of 
the state available resources to pose a threat e.g. military and political capability, while the 
intention reflects the reasons and the objectives of the threat source towards the targeted 
state.  
 
Longman defined threat as an individual or an object that is eligible to pose damage 
and hurt to other people, or something that threatens domestic security of a state (longman, 
2004.p.953). The more the power increase, the more threat results. The issue of threat is 
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common in the political sphere, in most cases the level of threat is associated with power 
the threatening state possess. However, in a few cases the idea of threat is far from power. 
Indeed, certain states or groups are classified as threats to other states or groups, despite 
their weak power. The reason is attached with the capabilities of the state or group and its 
internal resources.  
  
Coalition is defined by Edwin Fedder as “a set of members acting in concert at X 
time regarding one to N issue.”  Moreover, Fedder stated the formation of alliance is 
restricted to specific objectives of a state that is in need for alliance against the external 
threats where these alliances usually form for a short temporary period (Fedder, 1968.p.80). 
To sum up, the factor of power explains what drives states relations with other.  
 
2.3 Balancing behavior 
 
In international politics, the idea of balancing occurs more often among states than 
bandwagon; at least that is the expectation of Neorealism or Structural Realism – the most 
prominent theory in the Realist paradigm. The most significant theory synonymous with 
Neorealism is Balance of Power (BOP). BOP starts from the assumption that the 
distribution of capabilities is a significant determinant of relations among states; since 
states seek to maintain their sovereignty, they prefer to counter more powerful states alone 
(Miller, 2006.p.12), but since this might be a daunting task, they choose from available 
alliance options. States also chose alliance since they might face a threat which demands 
an immediate reaction, the resources for which are not available. Since a simple BOP 
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emphasizes the distribution of capabilities as the factor which determines outcomes, Walt 
explored the proposition that states respond to threats – not simply to concentrations of 
capabilities; moreover, states do that via two strategies, either by balancing or by 
bandwagoning (Walt, 1987).  
 
In terms of balancing, balance of threat is an interpretation of Neorealism which 
emphasizes on the creation of alliances against sources of threat (Scheerder, 2012.p.8). 
Balancing is an alliance established between two or several states for the purpose of 
preventing being dominated by powerful states (Walt, 1987.p.18). In other words, State A 
joins an alliance with state B (stronger state) to secure and preserve its stability against 
state C that poses a threat due to its superior resources.  
 
States are forced to choose the option of balancing for two serious calculations. One 
is that states choose to ally with dominant powers, or a “stronger state,” where the 
intentions of these states are not to dominate them. In other words, if weak states failed to 
deter threats alone, they opt to ally with powerful states that do not intend to dominate them 
(Walt, 1985.p.5).  Hence it’s the best decision for these states to prevent being dominated 
by threatening states. Calculation two: alliancing with weaker states increases strong states’ 
influence as the weaker side is in a great demand for support (Walt, 1985.p.6). By achieving 
this, its influence in the alliance would expand, whereas joining the strong states lessens 
this opportunity because its adds less influence to the alliance or coalition, which, on the 
other hand, would not serve nor impact the alliance (Walt, 1987.p.18).  
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According to Walt, balancing is established as a result of perceived threats (Walt, 
2010.p.10) rather than the power alone. In other words, a state’s decision to enter a 
balancing alliance is due to the concern of threat posed by regional powers, and not because 
of the power of the regional state’s poses. To deter and contain threat, states usually prefer 
to increase their power through balancing with the stronger side, mainly with greater power 
that does not pose a threat nor intent to dominate weaker states. This in return would deter 
any potential domination by threatening states over those states via the military bases 
(Walt, 1987.p.149). As an example, certain military bases are present in the Gulf region 
such as the American military bases; “Al-Udied Air base” in Qatar (Brimelow,2018) in 
addition to the recent Turkish base “ Tarqi bin Ziyad” (Daily Sabah Politics, 2017) .  These 
military bases are an indirect form of balancing against particular threats. Further, during 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 the United States was able to counter Iraq because to 
its presence in the region after the withdrawal of Britain. In addition, the form of military 
alliance is more effective in contrast to the political alliance. The power of military will 
strengthen the role of foreign power, especially if the regional power e.g. Iran is in a 
conflict with the existence of the foreign power e.g. US in the region. Since Iran is anti-
US, it believes the US presence in the Gulf is a serious threat to Iran’s stability. 
  
Furthermore, commitments play an important role in the formation of alliances. The 
longer the alliance lasts, the more commitment it requires. As a result, three levels of 
commitment are available to support this claim (Walt, 1987.p.152). The most important 
level of commitment is the highest level in which states victimize its supreme resources in 
order to fulfill the alliance’s obligations. In this level, states face the severe fate to fulfill 
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the commitments even if it’s at the expense of its territory and people. States could sacrifice 
money and people to gain political protection because of its requirement of security alliance 
in addition to military intervention. This level of commitment often requires balancing 
rather than bandwagoning, and presents the longest duration estimated at three years or 
more (Walt, 1987.p.152). The moderate level involves a great risk of military intervention 
where states suffer the loss of thier resources in addition to forming unwilling political 
cooperation to provide support for their allies. The least important commitment is the low 
level; no action is required, neither political nor military. It’s considered as a symbolic 
commitment due to the absence of scarifies (Walt, 1987.p.152).  
 
In some scenarios, regional threatening states are worrisome to their neighbors. The 
level of threat is determined by the geographical factor. The more the threat is 
geographically close, the more threat it poses (Walt, 1987.p.23). By contrast, the level of 
threat declines with distance. Therefore, the Gulf States favored to balance with the United 
States instead of bandwagon with Iran. Yet, this balancing is a double-edged sword in 
which the US became a GCC ally. This consequently provoked Iran because of Iran’s 
assumption that the GCC should ally with Iran and that Iran does not constitute a source of 
regional instability.  After the Saudi-Iraqi alliance in 1979, as a response to the Islamic 
Revolution, Saudi-Iran bilateral relation worsened (Poole, 2016). 
  
The intent of Saudi Arabia was to prevent the export of Iran’s revolution to the Gulf 
as it demands to overthrow the Gulf’s regimes, so this intention made Iran a real threat to 
the region. More recently, the Saudi led a coalition in Yemen consisted of the Gulf States, 
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with the exception of Oman, along with several Arab states against Iranian operations in 
Yemen (Reuters). This alliance is an indirect war with Iran via its proxy in Yemen because 
Iran supplies weapons to the rebels while the coalition fights these rebels. Observers 
believe this coalition is unsuccessful for one reason which is the inability of Saudi and its 
coalition to end the war and reform the domestic situation in Yemen. Rather it worsened 
the situation through the effects the war brought to Yemenis, e.g. famine and spread of 
disease. Iran is unwilling to end the war and in case Iran achieved a victory, this victory 
would pave the way for it to become the dominant regional power, as Iraq was previously. 
   
2.4 Bandwagoning, as state behavior  
 
In contrast to balancing, bandwagoning occurs when states establish an alliance 
with source of danger or threatening state instead of balancing against it (Walt, 
2000.p.102).  Despite the fact that bandwagon is less common than balancing, States opt 
to choose this option when the factor of strong support ally is absent. There are two motives 
that force weak states to bandwagon with the threatening powers. First, the decision to 
bandwagon might be a result of appeasement (Walt, 1985.p.7).  
 
 Bandwagoning is formed for defense purposes as weak states’ main objective is to 
secure themselves and prevent being attacked by threatening states. Conversely, this type 
of alliance is more dangerous because the state risks all its resources despite its weakness. 
In this case, it will become a state that relies on the threatening side. Second, the state 
desires the taste of victory through the victorious of its ally during the periods of wars 
 26 
 
(Walt, 1985.p.8). Weak small states have no impact or influence to deliver the powerful 
side. Therefore, weak states select to establish bandwagon to obtain benefits.  
Moreover, weak states must consider the future perceptions and intentions of their allies 
because these intentions are capable to change through time, which might not be in the 
favor of these states. For example, during peace time, strong states might have better 
relation with weaker states; however, it is able to turn its intentions by initiating war against 
small states to pose control. Consequently, small states must be aware while bandwagoning 
and this option should be made at a least because the strongest side might take advantage 
of the weak states in terms of territory, military, etc. to preserve their security.  
 
The geographic proximity of the threatening states influences the alliance 
decisions. The more weak states are close to the threatening state, the more vulnerable they 
become to avoid balancing and form bandwagon alliance due to the fact that the powerful 
states are capable to force small states into obedience and use their resources to accomplish 
its domination objectives (Walt, 1987).  
2.5 Factors of Threat 
 
Based on Walt’s theory, the motives behind states decision to ally with others is driven 
by fear and threat, not solely power. As a result, the level of threat is measured by the 
superiority of states resources which include: aggregate power, geographic proximity, 
aggregate intentions and offensive capabilities.  
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2.5.1 Aggregate power 
 
First, the aggregate level of a state’s capabilities is the main element that alarms less-
powerful states. These resources comprise: the total population of the state, its industrial 
possessions and their diversity, and its military potential which impose danger on others 
(Walt, 1987.p.22). The aggregate power has a significant role in preserving the national 
security of a state besides supporting the increasing level of threat. Iran, unlike the Gulf 
countries, has the largest population in comparison with the Gulf. Its total population was 
an estimated 80.9 million in 2017, according to a statistics published by Trading Economics 
(tradingeconomics.com). As a result, Iran’s population is triple the population of the Gulf, 
which causes a serious threat to the region due to the fact that Iran has the ability to sweep 
the region in case of outbreak of war in the Gulf caused by Iran. Consequently, the greater 
the state owns resources, the greater threat it possess (Walt, 1985.p.9). Although the factor 
of power may be a threat, it may be prized. States that posse superior power are able to 
reward allies or punish enemies; hence, a new state’s aggregate power is a motivation for 
bandwagon or balancing (Walt, 1985 .p.10).  
 
 Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia is considered the largest country in the Gulf, this did 
not prevent Saudi from requesting American support and increasing bilateral relations 
among the two states for the purpose of securing the Gulf. Furthermore, during the 
seventies the hegemony of Iran in the Gulf was clear in terms of the strength of its military. 
In contrast to the second regional power Iraq, Iran’s military spending was greater, and in 
fact, reached six times higher than that of Iraq; consequently it enabled Iran to conquer the 
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three Emirati islands (Gause, 2003.p.285). 
 
 However, the situation in Iran was in Iraq’s favor. The chaos in Iran after the revolution 
permitted Iraq to progress its power, leading to it initiating a war against its neighbor. 
During the period of the war 1980-1988, the military power swung between the two states. 
In certain phases of war, Iraq dominated, this was especially during the beginning of the 
conflict from 1981-1982 and in 1988 because of the Iraqi missile attacks against Iran 
(Tyler, 1988). 
 
 
Although Iraq was the responsible state for launching the war, it attempted several 
times for a cease-fire, nonetheless Iran rejected the cease fire until 1988. Regardless of 
these attempts, Iraq was regarded as the victorious state despite the fact that no state was a 
clear military winner. Therefore Iraq emerged, not only as a serious military threat to Iran 
and the Gulf States, but also with the ability to invade Kuwait in 1990.  
 
 
2.5.2 Geographic proximity 
 
Geographic proximity and proximate power play an essential role in evaluating the 
seriousness of threat. The closer the threat, the more danger it arises. Consequently, a 
state’s priority is to create alliances based on the threats that are posed by nearby powers 
rather than distant threats. The danger of geographic proximity increases the degree of 
conflict and tension among Iran, Iraq and the Gulf. The reason goes back to the period of 
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the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Similar to Iran, the geographical location of Iraq is very close 
to the Gulf especially as it borders Kuwait. Both Iraq and Kuwait share joint borders which 
permit Iraq to enter Kuwait in a short period of time.  
 
Hence, this was illustrated in 1990 after the Iraqi troops occupied Kuwait in less 
than a half day through their common border. As a consequence of Iraq-Iran war and 
Kuwaiti invasion, Iraq became a weak state, henceforth, it contributed to strengthen Iran’s 
role in the region. In addition, Iran’s occupation of the three islands is another example that 
reflects the importance of the geographical proximity. Geographic proximity leads to either 
balancing or bandwagon. In terms of balancing, GCC States (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar with the exception of Oman) formed a 
balancing alliance against Iran’s proxy intervention in Yemen.  A Bandwagoning alliance 
on the other hand is established among weak states that share common borders with strong 
states, and therefore might be vulnerable and forced to ally to prevent being under the 
domination of them. This is accurate if the powerful neighboring state is capable of 
enforcing obedience (Walt, 1987.p.24).  
 
2.5.3 Aggressive intentions “Offensive intentions” 
 
States that are perceived as aggressor permit other states to provoke balancing against 
them. Moreover, balancing is triggered by states with moderate capabilities in case of being 
perceived as aggressors (Walt, 1985 .p.13). Walt argued that states are barely opting for 
bandwagon if a state is confirmed as aggressive. In addition, if the aggressive states’ 
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intentions are unlikely to alter, the sole way to prevent falling under the aggressor is by 
balancing with others (Walt, 1985 .p.13).  
 
 Iraq was a nightmare for the Gulf region, thus it led Saudi Arabia and its neighbors to 
balance against it due to the fact that Iraq had dangerous ambitions in the region such as its 
invasion of Kuwait.  The intentions of Iran were derived by action, in contrast to Iraq, 
which was behaving by declaration and actions. After the Iranian revolution, Iran was the 
major threat to Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf. Therefore, the Gulf had alliance with 
Iraq in the war against Iran (Mahmoud, 2017) to counter the Iranian threat. 
 
 However, the situation changed in 1990 in which Iraq desired to show that its war with 
Iran was not detrimental to the strength of Iraq; instead it strengthened its power and 
decided to invade Kuwait which caused the Gulf countries to balance with U.S to minimize 
the threat. Through the two wars, Saddam was willing to impose his sovereignty and 
confirm his aggressiveness while also attempting to takeover oil in the joint fields with 
Kuwait and Iran. Likewise, the changing perceptions were malleable through history; most 
recently, the Iranian threat is higher as it seeks to control the region through its intervention 
in the recent Yemeni crisis.   
 
The intention, not power, is crucial and if the intentions of the aggressiveness are 
impossible to change, the state that bandwagon with it would become a victim (Walt, 
1987.p.26). Accordingly, the Gulf would not oppose Iran and Iraq if they have peaceful 
intentions, yet it was the opposite where both demanded to be the dominant regional power. 
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2.5.4 Offensive capabilities “offensive power” 
 
The capability of the state to threaten the sovereignty of another state or territory is 
due to the possession of offensive power (Walt, 1987.p.165). Otherwise, states with greater 
offensive resources provoke others to ally with than states that lack military power (Walt, 
1985 .p.11). However, Walt stated that balancing is an unfortunate decision because the 
ally may not be capable of providing immediate support (Walt, 1985 .p.11).   
 
Whenever a state is located close to a state that has huge offensive capabilities, the 
sole solution for state is a bandwagon alliance as the decision to balance would not be in 
its favor. Consequently, this is applied significantly in the case of Iraq and Iran.   
The offensive capabilities of Iran are incomparable with the Gulf. The Iranian armed forces 
are greater since the Pahlavi era, despite the dispensing of the Shah’s military after the 
revolution. The objective from focusing on improving the defense is related to the national 
interest. Iran learnt a lesson from its long war with Iraq and decided to protect its national 
security by establishing an outstanding military defense. Additionally, the production of 
WMD including the nuclear program is a new way used by Iran to threaten its neighbors, 
and specifically US, as Iran is anti-west and anti U.S in particular. During the Iraq-Iran 
war, Iran suffered from the Iraqi chemical attacks, which neglected the 1925 convention in 
Geneva which stipulated the prohibition usage of chemical weapons (Jones, 2008.p. 41). 
All of these elements affected the offensive intentions perceived by the GCC because it 
forced them to perform an alliance with Iran instead of bandwagon with the source of threat 
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due to the GCC assumption that this threat may eventually turn against them. Walt assumed 
that despite the importance of these sources, it’s hard to prioritize one over the other since 
each element is effective in assessing the threat perception.  
 
2.6 Evaluation of Walt’s theoretical approach by other scholars 
 
Walt’s approach received diverse reactions from International Relations (IR) 
scholars. Robert Keohane in his piece “Alliances, Threats and the uses of neorealism” 
commented on Walt’s notion of states. Walt believed that states responded toward threats 
instead of power, and the other four capabilities states possess impose a greater threat than 
solely power. Yet, Keohane contradicts Walt. He considered Walt’s views in terms of 
critique of Neorealism theory. Keohane stated “Balance of Threat theory” requires so much 
information about perceptions as well as objective facts that it has relatively little 
theoretical power of its own (Keohane, 1988.p.172).  
 
Therefore, the factor of power is greater in terms of threat. Numerous states e.g. 
Iraq were known as a powerful and aggressive state not due to its capabilities, but rather 
due to its aggressive and violent leadership. This can also be applied to North Korea. 
Accordingly, the balance of the GCC with US during the invasion of Kuwait in 1990 
resulted from Saddam’s power. In addition, Keohane critiqued the examples presented by 
Walt, especially the Egyptian case2. From Keohane perspective, Walt cannot examine the 
Middle East cases because his analysis was based on secondary English data. Moreover, it 
lacked the value of in depth research besides understanding the nature of Middle East 
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region where he accused Walt of not being an expert to discuss the matter (Keohane, 
1988.p.172).  Another criticism was given by John Vasquez. His criticism was shaped by 
Imre Lakatos’ model of “Scientific progress.”3 Vasquez assumed Walt’s assessments as 
falsification of Kenneth Waltz theory of Balance of power4. He stated that states pursue the 
balancing behavior against the power of the state, rather than threats. Hence, if threats and 
power are independent variables according to Walt, an obstacle in the realist world will 
take effect.  
 
The criticism of Schweller was also mentioned by Vasquez to justify his argument. 
Schweller claimed the states desire to gain more strength is to achieve its interests and 
expansion, and not for security matters. The behavior of Bandwagon is more common than 
balancing as the weaker states will choose to ally with the powerful state because the 
powerful side does not pose a threat contrary to Walt (Vasquez, 1997.p.904-905). In 
contrast, Walt responded to Vasquez’s argument regarding the concept of power and threat. 
From the perspective of Walt, power and threat are not independent (Walt, 1997.p.933). 
Theory of balance of power emphasizes on the alliance of several states against the 
strongest states while balance of threat predicts that states form alliance against the source 
of threat. Hence, even though there are common features in both theories, they are diverse 
(Walt, 1997.p.933). 
 
Moreover, Sorokin assumed Walt’s concept of balancing against threats instead of 
power to be deficient. He argued that states endeavor security through its military 
capabilities solely without the support of others. He even reviewed the alliance definition 
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of Walt and reformulated it to “formal agreement between sovereign states for the purpose 
of coordinating their behavior in the event of specified contingency of a military nature”.  
Finally, Sorokin stated that alliances in some cases are established to strengthen the self-
governance of a state (Sorokin, 1994.p. 422-423).  
 
To sum up, the above scholars’ assumptions on threat perception contradict with 
Walt’s belief that threat, and not power, determine the formation and the type of alliances. 
The scholars agreed that power is the primary factor in forming alliance because with 
power, states could achieve and obtain their ambitions in addition power is determine the 
level of threat not the vice-versa.   
 
Walt’s emphasis on the political level of threats and how they constitute a danger 
helps us understand one of the most important elements of threat which is social threat. 
Social threat is an essential tool to understand the nature of conflicts, such as in the conflict-
ridden Middle East; in the Middle East, sources of domestic and regional war, rivalry, and 
conflict have included ethnic, religious or identity differences. Moreover, political and 
social threats are intimately tied, which adds credibility to the use of Walt’s approach to 
understanding source of alliances. Considering Iraq as an example, Iraq was considered as 
a Sunni state despite the Shiite majority. However, after Iran’s intervention in Iraq’s affairs, 
the society was governed by Shiite president and Shiites obtained freedom to practice their 
sects in public.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
 
Threat perception theory is an essential framework to understand the political 
behavior of states. The state’s decision to perform either a balancing behavior or 
bandwagon is determined based on the surrounding fear and its interests. If the interest is 
in gaining advantages, Bandwagon is preference and vice versa. In a globe fully loaded 
with threats and power, states must seek an alternative solution rather than the available 
selections. If the state relies upon itself in terms of capabilities and strengthen its political 
status, it will not be forced to side with undesirable state because it has the potential to 
preserve its security despite the greater capabilities of the others.  Despite the criticism of 
Walt’s theory, the theory plays an important role in understanding the nature of Middle 
East alliances.  
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Chapter 3: Iran, UAE and the case of the three islands and the Bandwagon 
Behavior by the Three Gulf States from 1980-1988. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter aims to illustrate three themes. First, it will address the issue of the 
three Emirati islands that were, and still are, under the occupation of Iran. Then, it evaluates 
Iran’s threat in the event of enhancing its occupation position on the islands. Second, it will 
analyze the motives that led to the outbreak of Iraq-Iran war, and the extent of escalation 
of the Iranian and Iraqi threat, in addition to the position of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait 
regarding the war. Third, the theory of balance of Threat will be applied to the studied cases 
in order to validate the threat in the region.  
 
3.2 The territorial dispute of the three islands between United Arab Emirates and 
Iran 
 
Prior to the actual occupation of Iran over the islands of Abu-Musa, the Greater and 
Lesser Tunbs in 1971, the islands were under the sovereignty of the Qawasim tribe who 
were located in the Emirates Sharjah and Ras-alKhaima (Almezmaah) on the Southern 
coast. The recognition of the Qawasim sovereignty over the islands was acknowledged by 
Britain as the Qawasim5  ruled the islands since the 18th century (Roken, 2001.p.180). 
However, Iran pursued aggressive  decision where it raised the Iranian flag on the three 
islands and removed the Arab flags (Abed &Vine, 2001.p.182) .Since then, Iran attempted 
 37 
 
for several times to verify its islands property; nonetheless, all the attempts were 
unsuccessful. Iran-UAE dispute intensified after Britain announced its withdrawal from 
UAE by the end of 1971 (Almezmaah). Accordingly, two days before the declaration of 
UAE independence, Iran was able to fill Britain’s vacuum through a military invasion on 
the islands (Cecily, 2012).  
 
In terms of geography, the island’s location is estimated to be a distance of 22- 38 
sea miles off the Iranian coast in contrast to 32 miles of Ras-AlKhaima Emirate (Al-
Nahyan, 2014.p.36). Further, Abu-Musa, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs are located between 
UAE from the western side and Iran from the Northern side (Al-Nahyan, 2014.p.32), in 
particular, near the Strait of Hurmuz. As such, Hurmuz is a strategic point for trade, around 
40% of the international oil passes through the Strait (Thomas, 2012).  
 
In detailed analysis, moreover, The Greater Tunb is located between Abu-Musa and 
the Lesser, it is 27 km southwest of the island of Qashem. Further, it’s situated around 50 
kilometers from Bander Abbas plus 70Km away from the Emirate of Ras Al-Khaima 
(Arayee &Jalinusi, 2007.p.2).  The smallest island among the three “the Lesser Tunb”, is 
45 Km distance from Bander Abbas and 80 Km from Ras Al-Khaima (Arayee &Jalinusi, 
2007.p.2). By contrast, Abu-Musa is the largest among the three, its located 67 Km from 
the Bandar Abbas (Arayee &Jalinusi, 2007.p. 2) whereas 60Km far of north of emirate of 
Sharjah (Hrana.org). Therefore, geographically speaking, Abu-Musa is closer to UAE 
rather than Iran.  
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Considering Abu-Musa is situated overlooking the Strait of Hurmuz 
(Muǧtahidzāda, 2013.p.163) this permits Abu-Musa to control and manage the passage of 
oil tankers, in addition to imposing the limitation of export and import.  Ever since British 
mandate over the Gulf, Iran justifies its title and sovereignty over the three islands via 
certain claims.  
 
Iran had always supported its claim via its clarifications that the islands were part 
of Iran’s territory, however, Britain handed them to Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaima. 
According to the Shah’s declaration, “the islands were originally Iranian; nevertheless 
Britain intervened over our sovereignty and managed to steal the islands. Then it offered 
them to Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaima which are under its protection” (Al-Nhayan, 
2014.p.47). In addition, Iran based its claims on a British map that was presented to the 
Qajar Shah “ Nasir Al-Din Shah Qajar 1848-1897” in 1886 which illustrated the islands 
were part of Iran (Muǧtahidzād, 2006.p.358) because of its geographical proximity. 
Likewise, the map illustrated the three islands as Iranian territories for the fact that it had 
the same color of Iran in the map. Thus, it indicated the islands were Iranian owned territory 
despite Britain’s claim of a map error (Roken, 2001.p.188-189).  
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3.3 Memorandum of Understanding 
  
A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Sharjah and Iran in 1971. 
The memorandum clarified the rights of both states concerning the disputed islands. The 
agreements consisted of several articles (Muǧtahidzāda, 1999.p.211). The most important 
conditions were; Iran has the right to occupy the north side of Abu-Musa, while the rest of 
Abu-Musa Island is governed by the emirate of Sharjah. Second, Iran would have a full 
control on its North side and  has the right to raise the flag on the Iranian military 
headquarter, whereas, the flag of Sharjah would be raised in the police station as well as 
maintaining the right of jurisdiction and sovereignty over the rest of Abu- Musa (Mattir, 
2005.p.159). Lastly, the recognition of islands territory breadth by Sharjah and Iran, with 
the breadth being proximately 12 maritime miles6 The ruler of Sharjah Shaikh Khalid Al-
Qasimi approved the terms upon being threatened by Iran and compulsorily accepted the 
divisions of the islands. However, Iran claimed that Al-Qasimi accepted the agreement 
voluntarily without coercion or pressure (Arayee, Jalinusi, 2007.p.5.).  
 
3.4 Iran occupation of the three islands and its implications on UAE stability 
 
The Iranian occupation over the three Emirati islands poses a great threat to the 
United Arab Emirates via certain aspects. Iran’s aggregate power is great in contrast to 
UAE. Since the beginning of the occupation, Iran sought to transform the islands into a 
small military base in the Gulf. Ever after the emergence of the Islamic Republic, Iran’s 
military forces continued to arrive and settle in Abu-Musa and Greater Tunb (cia.gov). 
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Further, during Iraq-Iran war, Abu-Musa, the Greater and the Lesser Tunbs were used as 
military bases by the Iranian Naval and Armed forces. Accordingly, Iran launched an attack 
via helicopters and small boats against the Gulf oil tankers as well as to certain UAE oil 
stations (Mattir, 2005.p.176).  
 
  In terms of military, Iran’s military is superior in contrast to the UAE military. 
During the Iraq-Iran war, the size of Iran’s spending on military amounted 5.5 Billion US 
Dollars, reaching to 19 billion between 1980-1984. Therefore, it illustrated the danger UAE 
could face regarding Iran’s usage of the occupied islands to launch an attack against UAE. 
In return, the minimum share of spending was for UAE, estimated around 1.5 to 2.2 billion 
(Khalaf, 1987.p.20-21)7. The lack of spending was associated with the lack of military 
expertise. The region had not been subjected to a heavy war before the invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990. Moreover, UAE did not perceive Iran during Shah’s regime as a source of threat 
because the region was not an interest for the Shah in contrast to his relations with the 
West, especially US. On the contrary, Mohammed Raza Shah characterized Iran as the 
“Guardian of the Gulf” (Aslan, 2017). The Gulf States were never recognized as separate 
self-governing states according to Iran’s perspective (Al-Qasimi, 2015). As a consequence, 
Bahrain was assumed by the Shah as a part of Iran. Further, the Shah’s policy toward the 
Gulf, regardless of being the police of the region, was severe because the occupation of the 
three islands took place during his reign (Mana, 2015). In comparison with Iran’s policy 
towards US after the Shah, the United States enjoyed warm relations with Iran. Indeed, US 
considered the Shah as the guarantor of American interests in the region along with Saudi 
Arabia (Molavi, 2010). However, this perception has changed after the arrival of the US, 
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following British departure. 
   
The Iranian actions at the island of Abu-Musa presented a concern to UAE. Iran 
began to manage flights to Abu-Musa from Bander Abbas. According to a thesis by 
Alkabbi, UAE perceived that Iran had the intention to bring military soldiers to the island 
and to store the war supplies (Al-Kaabi, 1994.p.12).  These intentions have negative impact 
on UAE due to the possibility to exposure attacks from Iran. Furthermore, Iran managed 
to establish an airstrip to permit its emergency response in case of a sudden external attack. 
Consequently, the military troops expanded to reach 4,000 troops compared to 700 (Foley, 
1999.p.7). Meanwhile, Iran demanded to control UAE via the occupation. It maintained 
Iranian military presence in the islands in order to impose its compulsory presence in which 
it conducted military maneuvers around the three islands via its air and naval forces (Al-
Nhayan, 2014. p.68).  
    
Per contra, UAE status under the Gulf Cooperation Council is diverse. With GCC, 
UAE supported the claims and resolutions of its neighboring states regarding the islands. 
According to an online article,  UAE and its regional GCC allies were determined to held 
a meeting in 2012  with regard to visit of Ahmadinejad to the one of the occupied islands 
“ Abu-Musa”. Indeed, this visit outraged the Emirates, hereafter, the Emirati Foreign 
Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed acknowledged Ahmadinejad’s visit as a violation 
against the state (The Jerusalem Post, 2012). Bilaterally however, UAE has another 
dimension. As a result, both UAE and Iran share commercial ties, the concern of the islands 
is minor in the economic field. For Iran, UAE is the major partner in exporting and 
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importing and vice versa. As such, the total cost of UAE exported goods to Iran estimated 
$8.7 billion (Reuters). 
 
 Hence, Iran’s export increased to reach 53% in 2011 whereas it dramatically 
decreased in 2014 to reach 11.2% after the compulsory sanctions against Iran (Sumaya, 
2015)8. Despite the sanctions, UAE maintained its commercial ties with Iran. All the 
exports and imports between the two countries pass via the Strait of Hurmuz ( Tabarani, 
2009.p.64). Conversely, Iran demanded to expand its regional aspirations capabilities in 
order to dominate UAE and the regional economy to be in its advantage. The security of 
the Hurmuz is Iran’s primary aim to facilitate its exports and to secure the oil shipments.  
 
 For that reason, Iran threatened to close Hurmuz in the face of US (Johnson, 2016). 
Iran is capable of initiating attacks against potential external threat via the utilization of the 
small islands (Al-Jazeera Centre, 2012). In addition, Iran has the capability to plant mines 
around Hurmuz to prevent the entrance of un-wanted ships e.g. US Ships. Iran preserves 
around 200 patrols besides several combatants on its coastal to begin the laying of mines. 
The Iranian equipment is unique as they are rapid and unable to detect via radar (Talmadge, 
2008.p.89)9. Therefore, the Strait would face the danger of inserting four minefields at its 
gate among the Island of Tunb Island from the east.  
  
The Organization of petroleum Exporting Countries is the major source of Gulf 
revenues. The Gulf States supply one-third of oil production worldwide and produce 
around a quarter of world’s total production which make them the world top oil producing 
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countries (Alcaro, 2013.p.36) Additionally, UAE is among the larger producers of natural 
gas, around 84% in the whole region (EIA, 2017). Closing Hurmuz is Iran’s sole choice to 
counter the US role in the Gulf. Yet, it intended to terrify the Gulf through considering the 
US-GCC alliance as a threat “If the Americans and their regional allies want to pass 
through the Strait of Hormuz and threaten us, we will not allow any entry” (Al-
Jazeera.com). 
 
 Iran’s threat to US is to achieve a specific motive regarding UAE and the Gulf. 
Indirectly, Iran demands to put the Gulf under its control via the prohibition of the US 
ships. Thus, the regional tension increases and forces the Gulf States to restrict their US 
relations to prevent Iran from applying its Hurmuz threats. If the Strait was blocked, UAE 
exports outside the Gulf would decrease and results in economic imbalance, limiting US 
imports of regional oil. Further, during the rule of the Shah, Hurmuz was a big concern for 
Iran’s economy. The Iranian oil tankers had no alternative other than passing through 
Hurmuz. In case of launching attack against the Strait, Iran’s economy will collapse and 
the oil will be at an excess because it will not be shipped to importing countries. For US, 
the Iranian menace was always verbal because Iran lacked the naval capabilities. Its ships 
are undeveloped and small in comparison with the US ships, which explain Iranian inability 
to launch an attack and block Hurmuz. This further explains that Iran’s aim is to escalate 
the instability in the region. In case Iran attacked the US ships or forces, US Navy and its 
Gulf allies would resist this attempt (Singh, 2012.p.1). Blocking Hurmuz is Iran’s strategic 
technique to warn US and its GCC allies without performing action because it lacked of 
audacity to commit it. 
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  Blocking the Strait of Hurmuz is merely a tool used by Iran to threaten the GCC 
states and the oil exporting states. Iran’s budget and revenue derived from exporting oil 
estimated 70% (Singh, 2012.p.2); therefore, the percentage will impact Iran’s economy if 
a blockade is implemented. Second, it will pave the way for US to reinforce its 
administration on the Gulf region (Singh, 2012.p.2). However, this is against the policy of 
Iran concerning the region because Iran is against the presence of foreign powers in the 
Arab World. Also, the oil prices will boost pushing China to find a new source of 
exportation.  In addition, Iran is incapable of imposing a full domination on the Strait 
because its national economy would collapse; besides it will cause a destabilization on the 
Gulf economy. 
 
 Similarly, Dr. Shuja assured the majority of Iran’s profits derived from oil, around 
60%. Through blocking Hurmuz, Iran’s trade will be affected through the countries that 
used to import the Iranian oil and paused importing (Shuja, 2013.p.2) will penalize Iran. 
Henceforth, Iran would be exposed to US and United Nations pressure. Indeed, Iranian 
intentions from its threatening behavior to blockade the Strait are associated with its 
demands to examine the international responses towards its threatening claims. The Gulf 
region from Iran’s perspective is classified as Iranian geo-political sphere. Therefore, it 
identified the region as “Persian Gulf”. In other words, Iran’s occupation of the islands is 
connected to a geo-political reason towards the GCC. Recognizing the region as a Persian 
territory was an Iranian sign to intimidate the GCC and enhance its regional domination. 
Accordingly, Iran’s behaviors resulted from its political intentions of obtaining hegemony 
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and domain over UAE and the Gulf. Therefore, it justified its presence on the islands as 
attached to the Iranian national security that lies in the regional stability. Iran’s security is 
comprised of maintaining its occupation on the islands. Indeed, the rejection of Iran to 
UAE negotiations efforts is based on the fear of US influence over UAE decision since US 
is a powerful ally. “If Abu-Musa, Lesser and Greater Tunbs fell under a wrong authority, 
it would cause a serious harm to Iran” (Heard-Bey, 1981.p.124)10. Thus, the intent was to 
expel US out the region, because for Iran, US is perceived as an external power that 
impedes its political ambitions in certain aspects. First, US is the major ally to the Gulf 
besides it’s the guardian of the region from Iran’s greed’s. Second, Iran believes the US is 
distorting its image to prevent GCC from rapprochement with Iran. 
 
 Based on this, Iranian presence around UAE facilitates its hegemony, it unlocks 
the portal to intensely penetrate the Gulf because if UAE became under the Iranian 
domination, its consequence on the region would be significant as the Gulf States would 
weaken. Further, it demands to transform the Gulf into a territory belongs to Iran; similar 
to the previous assumption by the Shah “The Persian Gulf”11. By emerging as a hegemonic 
power, it permits Iran to behave in ways that is not in the region’s favor. The scenario of 
attacking the oil tankers during the war with Iraq is possible to take place again in case Iran 
became in a serious danger despite the Iranian statement of excluding military actions 
against the region (Irish, 2017).   
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At the political level, to escalate the dispute, Abu Musa was used as a capital of a 
new Iranian province titled “the Persian Gulf” (Al-Dulaimi et al, 2017 .p.95). Moreover, 
the claims of Iran’s exporting og its revolution to UAE is prosaic. UAE hosted a huge 
Iranian community; therefore, Iran is unwilling to sacrifice its citizens via humiliation 
treatments. Conversely, UAE is conscious regarding Iran’s terrorist attacks that might be 
performed by Iranian residents (Al-Dulaimi et al, 2017 .p.95).   
 
In conclusion, since the occupation of the three islands, UAE initiated several 
attempts with Iran to seek a solution to stop the escalation of dispute. Meanwhile, Iran was 
not eager to participate in negotiations due to the belief that the islands were originally part 
of Iran and were taken by Britain. Likewise, Iran confirmed its sovereignty over the islands 
based on their geographical proximity to Iran, and was willing to wage a war in order to 
not abandon the islands, claiming “the Gulf States should pass a sea of blood if they 
demanded to return the islands” (New York Times, 1992). The unwillingness of Iran to 
participate in negotiations resulted from its concept of “Persian Gulf,” because the 
departure of the islands does not serve Iran’s geo-political ambitions in the region. 
 
3.5 Historical background of the first Gulf war “Iraq-Iran war” 1980-1988 
 
After the Islamic revolution in Iran and the establishment of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, the region was threatened with two internal threats, Iraq and Iran. Meanwhile, Iraq 
assumed the new regime in Iran as threat to Iraq and its Gulf neighbors. As a result, Iraq 
waged a war against Iran in 1980. The outbreak of the war was associated with certain 
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justifications. First, the dispute over the Shatt-Al-Arab waterway, Saddam believed Shatt-
Al-Arab must be under his sovereignty and declared “This Shatt shall again be, as it has 
been through history, Iraqi and Arab in name and reality” ( Ateş, 2013.p.108). Thus, during 
the war, Iraq and Iran demanded to gain a full control of Shatt Al-Arab to take advantage 
of the oil fields in the Khuzestan province despite the Algerian treaty in 1975 that stipulated 
both states to share supremacy over the waterway (Amirahamdi, 1990.p.43).  
 
Indeed, the fear of the Iranian revolution was another major factor. Iraq was 
terrified that Iran might launch attacks against Iraq and establishes a second revolution. 
Because the regime of Iraq was secular and the sect of its president was Sunni, the issue of 
Shiite was a major concern. Khomeini’s interest was to transform Iraq into an Iranian 
fellow, especially because Iraq contains two of Shiite holy cities, Najaf and Karbala. Iraq 
intended to take advantage of the vacuum that occurred in Iran after the revolution. The 
Khomeini regime was new, fragile and lacked experience. It failed to establish an 
alternative system to replace the Shah’s former regime (Sabti, 1987.p.17)12. To make Iran 
preoccupied, Iraq planned to invade Iran and believed it was a golden opportunity that must 
not be wasted. If Iraq attained a triumph over its opponent “Iran”, it facilitated Iraq’s 
hegemony; however, Saddam miscalculated his project. Further, the war had political and 
sectarian aims. Both Khomeini and Saddam Hussain demanded to overthrow the other’s 
regime to attain their political intentions. For Saddam, he sought to expand his regional 
influence. Through defeating Iran, he would increase his status among the Arab leaders 
which would enable him to act in a more aggressive behavior, whereas, Khomeini 
demanded to overthrow Saddam’s regime to open the path for the Iraqi Shiite to attain 
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sovereignty over Iraq and transform Iraq under the sovereignty of Shiite.  
 
3.6 Factors escalated the Iranian threat during the Iraq-Iran war 
 
The war among the two regional powers began to destabilize the region’s security 
in which the Gulf region faced the greatest threat. As a consequence, UAE, in addition to 
the rest of the Gulf States, realized the sole solution to deter the Iranian threat was to 
bandwagon with Iraq.  Bandwagon with Iraq was an inevitable decision. The concept of 
overthrowing the Iraqi regime was a huge matter for the Gulf due to the Iranian intentions 
of emerging as the only power to spread its domination on the region. Thus, the Gulf States 
were fearful concerning an Iranian victory over Iraq because of its military strength in 
terms of its capabilities (Directorate of Intelligence, 1982). In addition, the number of 
Khomeini’s militaries diminished to 150,000 in comparison to the Shah’s military 285,000 
(Karsh, 2002.p.18-19). Accordingly, to ally with Iraq was the most accurate decision as the 
alliance will strengthen Iraq’s position against Iran.  Further, the region was weak and 
lacked the ability to secure itself. Therefore, Iraq was the guardian of the Gulf from the 
Gulf perspective to contain the Iranian danger.  
  
In 1983, as a form of financial support, Kuwait and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
(KSA) sold Al-Khafji oil production, which is located between the two countries. Both 
countries decided to provide Iraq all the oil revenues. Likewise, Kuwait and KSA lent Iraq 
financial aid estimated in a range between $20-$27 billion to support Iraq and revive it 
against Iran (Kaim, 2008.p.126). This indicated the GCC demanded to show their 
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commitment to avoid animosity with Iraq via financial aid. Besides, Saudi Arabia and its 
neighbors were willing to support Iraq politically and financially in order to protect them 
from Iran.  
 
Despite this bandwagon, UAE maintained its indirect neutrality (Davidson, 
2008.p.227). Iran is UAE major oil and non-oil importer besides it’s the most important 
trading partner. Between1980 and 1982, UAE was the major importer of Iran during the 
war. Per se, around 154% was the total of UAE importation alone in 1981 in contrast to 
28% to the rest of the Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman, Qatar and KSA) whereas, 
in 1983 UAE was at the peak with 219%. (Jahani, 2011). 
  
In terms of exports, UAE was the leading country during the last three years of war, 
in 1986 total exports to Iran estimated $448 , it suffered a decline in 1987 and 1988 to reach 
$251, yet it remained high (Jahani, 2011). Consequently, although UAE feared exposure 
to an attack from Iran, it had no intentions to damage the bilateral economic relations. 
These bilateral relations are classified as “ideal”, according to Abdu-Khalq Abdullah. He 
stated that trade relations between Iran and UAE are cordial and can be identified as ideal 
because both countries are willing to provide much convergence rather than divergence 
(Gulf news, 2002).  
 
Iran’s political intention was to export the Islamic revolution to the region, 
beginning with Iraq then to the Gulf States. The issue of exporting the revolution according 
to Khomeini concluded in the belief that Iran’s territorial borders extended to reach the 
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whole Islamic world and the concept of “theocracy” based on teachings of Islam must be 
implemented (Sabti, 1987.p.20).  In one of Khomeini’s speeches, he warned the Iranian 
revolution would be exported to the world in order to be taught its objectives 
(assakina.com). The threat to extend the revolution to Iraq was Iran’s major aim to facilitate 
it’s dissemination of revolution because Iraq is the passage to the Gulf. Iran’s accusations 
that Shiite is loyal to their sect despite their origins were a false perception. Since Iraq has 
certain Shiite cities such as Najaf, the sect escalation would influence Iraqis to conspire 
against their regime and accept the revolution to take place in Iraq. Nonetheless, the Iraqi 
Shiites were loyal to their Iraqi and Arab decent (Habeeb et al, 2012.p.52) In addition, the 
Dujail Shiite supported Saddam, he described them as brave (Raman, 2005). Hence, Iraqi 
Shiite demanded to unite and deny the ethnicity. However, a group of Dujail Shiite 
attempted to assassinate Saddam during his visit to give a speech in 1982 to thank the 
soldiers who were on their duty (Tapper, 2006).  This action therefore, reflects Iran’s social 
threat to Iraq’s internal stability because Iran desired to create sectarian divisions among 
Sunnis and Shiites.   
 
Unsuccessfully, Iran assumed the Iraqi population would provide support because 
of Iraq’s aggressive regime .Khomeini in 1982 called Iraqi citizens to welcome the Iranian 
forces and assist them in its invasion that he defined it as “the conqueror” (Sabti, 1987. 
p.59). Nevertheless, it was a failure attempt, to revive it; the attempt was connected with 
the concept of defending Islam rather than Iran’s ideology (Sabti, 1987.p.59) as the regime 
in Iraq was secular and did not abide by teachings of Islam. From the researcher’s point of 
view, the aim of exporting the revolution to the Gulf, mainly to Saudi Arabia, was to 
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awaken the Shiite populations of GCC. Iran assumed the GCC societies suffered from 
savagery and oppression from their leaders, considering the monarchy system was not 
following the true teachings of Islam. Saudi Arabia and its monarch’s neighbors GCC were 
concerned regarding Khomeini’s revolution, because it was perceived as a threat to their 
regimes’ survival and legitimacy (Kundi, 1989.p.95).  Replacing the monarchy regime by 
a theocratic regime that is based on the Velayet Al-Fagih would facilitate the region to be 
an ally and fellow of Iran, in particular the states with Shiite majority e.g. Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia. Thus, the commitment of Khomeini’s ideological conviction was seen as a 
tool to incite Shiite against their governments (Kundi, 1989.p.95).  
 
Meanwhile, both Iraq and Iran were threats to the GCC. However, it was impossible 
for the GCC to support Iran especially after the revolution of 1979. This is in fact associated 
with the fear of the new regime’s intentions. As a result, GCC decided to Bandwagon and 
support Iraq which was an option that can be characterized as the better of two bad choices. 
During the war, Iraq had one main aim which was to demolish Iran’s propaganda regarding 
its revolution (Al-Kaabi, 2011.p.15) as Iran was willing to extend the revolution to the 
GCC regimes. Further, the war was observed as a war filled of religious aims. Iran desired 
to replace the GCC regimes with more friendly regimes based on its interest and on Shiite 
Islam. In addition, the issues of identity and sectarianism played an important role in 
exacerbating the tension. Indeed, the identity of “Iraqi Sunni versus Iranian Shiite” and 
“Arabs versus Persian” created fear amongst the allied states “Iraq and GCC”. The GCC 
grew concerned about a Shiite revolution in their societies against their regimes, especially 
since the ruling elites are Sunnis; the scenario is similar with Iraq. Despite the fact that the 
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region was surrounded with two threats, GCC was not cautious regarding Iraq. This is 
related with Iraq’s initiative to wage a war against Iran to convince the Gulf that Iraq was 
willing to sacrifice itself to protect its neighbors and the Arab region.  
 
On the other hand,  Iran believed Shiite population in the Gulf were not accepting 
the principle of exporting the revolution, regardless Iran endeavored to expand its influence 
to Mecca through creating chaotic incidents during the rituals of Haj. Accordingly, in 1987, 
more than a thousand Iranian pilgrims (Washington Post, 1987) caused chaos while 
performing Haj after Friday prayer. The demonstration began between the Iranians and 
Saudi riot police in which Iranian shouted political statements calling for the fall of 
America and Israel along with praising Khomeini (Kifner, 1987). Likewise, the riots 
continued through burning cars and caused injuries to pilgrims, in addition to prohibiting 
the circulation around the Ka’ba (Washington Post, 1987). The incident was managed by 
the police; however, it caused the death of 402 pilgrims in which 85 were Saudis, 42 
innocent pilgrims of different nationalities, a security man and 275 Iranians (Kifner, 1987). 
As a reaction, Saudi Arabia regarded this tragedy as a source of Iranian threat to the internal 
stability of the Kingdom and the pilgrims.  
 
By the same token, Saudi endorsed to reduce the number of Iranian pilgrims in the 
following year, capping it to 45,000 compared to 150,000. Thus, Tehran boycotted the duty 
of Haji until 1990 (Kramer, 2008. p.167). The political hostility continued to ebb, reaching 
a peak in 2016 after attacking the Saudi embassy in Tehran which resulted from the 
execution of the Shiite cleric Nimr Al-Nimr by the Saudi regime. Iran’s aim resulted from 
 53 
 
its behavior was to alarm Saudi and spread terror among its nations that Iran is capable of 
extending its revolution and ideology influence. This incident could cause sectarian 
conflicts between Shiite and Sunni and escalate hatred and hostility. Moreover, it would 
encourage Saudi’s Shia to perform acts against their government and contribute to brain 
washing so loyalty would be ranked first to Iran and the sect of Shi’ism and last to regime 
if it was based on Islam though Shias assume it is not. The failure to extend the revolution 
would delay Iran’s regional hegemony.  
 
To counter the threat, the GCC managed to contain Iran via two techniques, first 
collectively through the creation of Gulf Cooperation Council and second via balancing 
with a foreign power “US” (Shanhan,2009.p. 4). Thus, in 1981 the Gulf Cooperation 
Council was founded to preserve security and peace (Ramazani & Kechichian, 1988. p.1). 
Its establishment was to achieve one main objective which is connected to the regional 
stability (Ramazani & Kechichian, 1988. p.1). The duty of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) was to deter internal threats e.g. Iran and Iraq along with any external threats. The 
GCC is classified as an original alliance organization, where it consists of several charters 
divided between social and economic integration as well as security (Kundi, 1989. p.93-
94). However, the council concentrated in advancing commercial relations while ignoring 
the important aspect “military”. Meanwhile, the absence of a potent military factor 
impacted the region. Therefore, the creation of Peninsula Shield Force took place the 
following year 1982 to enhance regional security (Kuffel, 2000. p.1).  A contribution of 
nearly 10,000 forces was provided by the members of the GCC in 1984 for the event of a 
peninsula Force in Saudi Arabia. The air forces of Iraq and Iran targeted the oil tanker ships 
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of Kuwait and Saudi in which Iraq aggressively fired bombs at the tankers, Saudi destroyed 
Iranian air plane type F-4 (Kuffel, 2000.p.4).  
 
The more the strength of the state, the more it’s capable of dominating the weaker 
side. On the other hand, by creating an alliance with Iraq, the GCC realized Iraq was 
incapable of countering Iran; hence, the states initiated a new alliance with external power 
“US”.  In the last century of the year 1930, Saudi Arabia and US engaged in diplomatic 
ties in terms of political and military understanding (Blanchard,2010 .p.3). However, both 
states attempted to peruse mutual security aims in 1950 after the periodic perceptions of 
both states concerning the Arab region’s dilemma e.g. Arab-Israeli conflict 
(Blanchard,2010 .p.4). Consequently, the alliance of US-GCC was due to the Gulf failure 
to contain Iran besides the realization that Iraq solely was incapable of confronting Iran. In 
terms of offensive capabilities, neither Iraq with its advanced forces nor the GCC managed 
to deter a quarter of the threat. Contrasting Iran, which was a new established Republic 
lacked experience, but was powerful because of its determination for victory to ease its 
invasion to the Islamic world.   
 
To fill the security vacuum, US successfully took advantage of the war to 
strengthen its military presence and maintain its position in the region. The American 
strategic intention from involving itself in the war despite its neutral position was to prevent 
Iraq and Iran from gaining victory over the other, because any victory achieved by one of 
the warring states, would create regional instability (Sabti, 1987.p.90). However, US had 
another plan. To restrain a victory over Iraq, U.S took an unprecedented decision in its 
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entire history. Since the legislations of U.S forbid donating financial assistance including 
loans, Iraq was removed from the list of terrorism (Tarock, 1998. p.84) in order to legalize 
the financial support due to the concern that Iraq might lose the war. Moreover, US 
declared the prohibition of Iranian victory; it was fully prepared to deploy a military force 
in Iraq to preserve its domestic security and prevent destabilization (Tarock, 1998. p.83) 
which would create chaos in the region. Additionally, Washington confirmed that if Saudi 
Arabia or Iraq requested any form of assistance, the demand would be met via air force 
(Tarock, 1998.p.84). The purpose of these proclamations was to cause menace and create 
a lack of confidence within its forces since it was solely verbal statement without initiating 
actions.  
 
Further, Iraq received economic aid as a shape of indirect political support. It 
received $300 million from the US administration due to the great demand of hard currency 
to purchase goods (Tarock, 1998.p.84) to aid Iraqi. In addition, Iraq was supported via 
exporting the Iraqi oil. Since Iran blocked Hurmuz, the oil would be exported via land 
routes. US decided to build a pipeline to compensate the loss as Iraq relay only on Hurmuz 
for its exports.  In spite of that, establishing the pipeline cost US large amounts of money, 
and hence, the request was rejected several times, until finally, George Bush13 succeeded 
to receive approval on a loan of $484 million (Tarock, 1998, p.85). Iran has hindered US 
interests in the region; therefore, its potential triumph over Iraq hardened the US mission. 
Nevertheless, US altered its assumption of Iraq and identified it as “aggressor” and 
requested a cease-fire.Iran’s political behavior after the Islamic revolution and the Iraq-
Iran war coerced the Gulf States to approve and accept United States as a factor of 
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preserving the domestic security in the region (Mansour, 2016 .p.18).  The researcher 
assumes that if the political vacuum in the region was not filled by US after Britain, the 
Gulf States would be in a tragic position because by themselves they would fail to maintain 
their stability.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
The region of the GCC was surrounded via two regional powers. These powers for 
two consecutive decades succeeded in creating a security gap in the region. During the 
Iraq-Iran war, the GCC considered Iran is the sole danger. This is associated with the arrival 
of Islamic Republic and Khomeini’s theory of exporting revolution. Therefore the failure 
of the GCC to realize that Iraq is also a threat resulted in being in a difficult situation after 
the war with Iran.  On the other hand, the status of Iran during Kuwait invasion in 1990 
managed to temper the conflict among Iran and the GCC.  Despite the interest of UAE in 
the islands case, UAE is not willing to create hostility with Iran because both states share 
common economic interests in terms of exporting and importing. 
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Chapter 4: THE DUAL THREATS: THE CASE OF KUWAIT AND THE 
EMERGENCE OF IRAN IN IRAQ 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter evaluates the threat perception observed by the Gulf States through 
two decades. The chapter will begin by addressing the balancing alliance of the GCC with 
US to counter the threat from Iraq 1990. Afterward, it will examine the development of 
Iran-GCC relations during the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammed 
Khatami. To conclude, the researcher will debate the newcomer threat to the region after 
2003 and its implications on Iraq’s domestic affairs.  
 
4.1 The balancing behavior by US-GCC  
 
As explained by Balance of Threat theory, states choose to forge alliance against 
the source of threat rather than power when the factor of reliable ally exists. Kuwait in 
addition to the Gulf States realized their lack of offensive capabilities to defend their 
nations and they were in desperate demand for an external military force. Thus, the 
balancing behavior by GCC states with United States has strengthened the regional defense 
factor, especially after Saudi Arabia was also threatened by Iraq through a deployment of 
military forces on the borders of Saudi. In order to attack Iraq, KSA approved to build a 
US base equipped with military capability with tanks and weapons to launch military 
operations installed from its territory. Besides the base, about 200,000 troops stationed in 
Saudi Arabia to perform defense operations to defend both Kuwait and Saudi (Allison, 
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2012, p.50-51). The total of US troops in the region were 500,000 (Elshtain, 1995.p.266).  
Indeed, the deployment of this large number of troops was to defeat the Iraqi forces.   Even 
more, the balance with US compromised of another form of assistance provided to the 
GCC. An international coalition was organized by US with the participation of 50 states 
for the purpose of liberating Kuwait. This assistance was divided between 200,000 
international troops, 750 aircrafts and 60 warships. In addition, these forces supported US 
coalition and delivered financial assistance to US estimated of $54 billion 
14(globalsecurity.org).   
 
Moreover, UN Security Council enforced several resolutions against Iraq 
condemning its urgent withdrawal. Some of these resolutions were: Resolution 660 
demanded both Kuwait and Iraq to negotiate to find a suitable solution for their disputes 
immediately after the invasion. Further, Resolution 670 emphasized on the continuation 
progress of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and refused the Iraqi’s historical claims of 
Kuwait annexation (UN.org)15.  
 
4.3 Threat Perception theory and the case of Iraq 
 
In order to apply Walt’s theory in the case of Kuwaiti, it’s important to consider the 
sources of threat that were discussed previously in chapter two. These sources are 
geographic proximity, aggregate power, aggressive intentions in addition to offensive 
capabilities, where all posed a direct threat in creating regional instability, in particular for 
Kuwait.  
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In terms of geographical proximity, Kuwait is the only Gulf state that is located 
very close to Iraq. It shares borders with Iraq from the north which facilitates the mission 
of Iraqi forces to occupy Kuwait. It is estimated that the borders distance among the two 
states is around 254km. Moreover, the size of the state constitutes the level of danger, the 
great the size of a state, the more risk it poses. Hence, the land area of Iraq is 437,367 sq 
km, whereas in contrast, Kuwait’s land area is 17,818 sq km. Therefore, Iraq is much 
greater than the size of Kuwait (Central Intelligence Agency). Meanwhile, Kuwait’s small 
land area permits the enemy to penetrate easily contrasting with other Gulf States. The joint 
borders with Iraq authorized an entrance for the latter to the Gulf region. Since Kuwait is 
the passageway, Saudi Arabia would be the next victim because Iraq aims to seize Kuwait.  
 
The lack of strong military forces besides Kuwait’s wealth in oil reserves and 
production were primary factors contributing to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The 
intentions of Iraq were to rob the Kuwaiti oil and control OPEC quotas. The factor of Oil 
was an important in developing Iraq’s economy. After the Iraq-Iran war, the production of 
oil dropped to less than 1 million barrel per day (Clayton, 2014.p.121).  Further, the 
invasion caused an increase of oil prices; nevertheless, Iraq managed to increase the 
production size to 3mb/d16 (Mabro, 1990.p.42-43). Iraq requested Kuwait $2.4 million as 
a substitute for the theft of Iraqi oil, however Kuwait rejected this demand (Rice, 2009, 
.p.9). Moreover, OPEC quotas were a serious matter for Iraq, it sought to impose its control 
to serve its interest since it was the sole plan to rebuild the economy of Iraq. The progress 
of Kuwait’s economy after the destabilization of oil prices boosted from $15 during the 
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Iraq-Iran war to reach $17 to $18 (Kostiner, 2009.p.85) before the invasion, managed to 
anger Iraq. Likewise, the expansion of Kuwait’s quotas at OPEC 20% (Taylor &Mansbach, 
2016) succeeded in producing more barrels. A year before the invasion, Kuwait managed 
to produce 500,000 barrels of oil, therefore, the state’s wealth rose to $9.3 billion which 
ranked the highest in its history (Kostiner, 2009.p.85). Hence, seizing the quota of Kuwait, 
Iraq would obtain a superior control of Kuwait production. Importantly, a dominance of 
oil production and barrel exports would take place. The original quantity of barrels would 
be sold to the global markets.  The additional barrels would either be sold in higher prices 
to compensate the rejected loans by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia or shipped to Iraq in order 
to gain straight profits. Both scenarios aim to improve the economic crisis in Iraq because 
a decline in oil prices determines the rate of profits. Thus, the plan of Iraq was to expand 
production. Hence, it would not be achieved without stealing Kuwait’s quotas of 20%, 
since Iraq was incapable of investing domestically and externally (Mabro, 1994.p. 242).  
 
As the embargo imposed on Iraq and Kuwait during the invasion that resulted in 
the prevention of both states in exporting their oil, the production of Saudi increased. It 
managed to produce 1 mb/d despite the region’s instability. In addition, the production 
reached its peak to 9 mb/d to compensate the loss of Kuwait because of the invasion which 
was reflected in Saudi’s rejection to cut its production (Mabro, 1994.p.248-250). For that 
reason, Iraq redirected its attention to Saudi through the deployment of a military force on 
Saudi’s borders; given it has the leadership of OPEC (Learsy, 2007.p.152) besides the 25% 
of Saudi’s OPEC quota (Taylor &Mansbach, 2016). Therefore, Iraq acquired 42% of 
OPEC production in case of a success in invading KSA.  Indeed, this would have allowed 
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Iraq to control around half of all OPEC quotas of oil production and caused quotas of other 
OPEC members to suffer limitations in production.  
  
In a report by Marbo, he examined the economic situation of Kuwait and Iraq if the 
relations between both states were in good terms. The absence of tensions enhances oil 
production status. Iraq solely would expand the rate of its oil production to reach 3.1 
million barrels per day (Marbo, 1994.p.245). Subsequently, it recompensed its financial 
loss in its war with Iran after Kuwait and KSA refused to provide monetary support to 
improve the economic situation of Iraq. Moreover, it enabled Iraq to repay its debts and 
promote its relations with the Gulf States especially on the political sphere.  Iraq would 
gain support and immunity of the Gulf to accomplish his intention of being the dominant 
power of the Middle East region. Such actions, would obtain him the trust of the Gulf 
leaders. However, invading Kuwait faded that ambition. In contrast to Iraq, Kuwait would 
precede 2.2 mb/d estimated with the neutral zone (Marbo, 1994.p.245). 
  
Further, the concern of oil is associated with the Kuwaiti regime. Saddam was 
willing to fulfill his desire of being the leader of the Arabs; however, to achieve the 
objective, the regime of Al-Subah must be overthrown. According to the Iraqi foreign 
minister Tarek Aziz, the intention of invading Kuwait was to implement a military coup 
against the Royal family and replace the regime with a domestic regime (Musallem, 
1995.p.133). Establishing a new regime would lead to a convenient solution to resolve the 
conflict, because the new regime would avoid confrontation from Iraq’s perspective 
(Musallem, 1995.p.133).  However, by overthrowing the Kuwaiti regime, Iraq had two 
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intentions. First, the fall of Kuwait would bring the fall of the Gulf region. Thus, the 
fragility of the GCC states would reveal the entrance of Iraq to consolidate Saddam’s 
authority of the region.  Second, the concept of Arab regional power, “the guardian of the 
Gulf,” similar to the Shah Mohammed Pahlavi17 had a significant influence on the 
emergence of Iraq’s hostile decisions. Saddam claimed to recapture Kuwait and annex it 
to Iraq. During the Ottoman Empire era, Kuwait was not an independent state; instead it 
was part of Iraq, particularly a part of the Iraqi city Al-Basra (Wilkenfeld & Brecher, 
1997.p.313) and this fostered Iraq’s demands. 
 
On the contrary, Iraq believed Kuwait must be protected against Iran because 
Kuwait has a large number of Shiite within its population which enables Iran to take 
advantage to export its revolution (Hassan, 1999.p. 75). Yet, these were excuses to justify 
the annexation of Kuwait and its association with Saddam’s aim of the dominant power. 
Taking into consideration the offensive capabilities, Iraq was superior. The Iraqi army was 
the strongest army and ranked the fourth place globally (Cordesman, 1994.p.187). 
Henceforth, the army successfully managed to impose a full occupation of Kuwait within 
two days. Also, Iraq endeavored to expand its army from 180,000 soldiers from Iraq-Iran 
war to 800,000 (Cordesman, 1994.p.187) in the several months preceding the 1990 
invasion. However, this number increased dramatically after the invasion to reach 955,000 
in addition to 480,000 of reserves soldiers (Cordesman, 1994.p.187). The aim from 
expanding the army size was not to repeat the previous mistake. During the war with Iran, 
although the power of Iraqi military was superior in number, Iraq failed to counter Iran. 
Accordingly, Iraq prepared a huge army with several categories. A total of 450,000 troops 
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were present in Kuwait Theater of operation which consisted of Republican Guards 
140,000, equipped with 2,880 armored personnel besides missiles and anti-weapons 
according to Department of defense report (1992.p. 93-95-104-113).  
 
Yet, Kuwait lacked all sorts of military equipment. The Kuwaiti army was small in 
comparison to Iraq. According to Musallem, the number of Kuwait’s army compromised 
of 16,000 soldiers (Musallem, 1995.p.180), another report indicated the number was 
12,000 (Terrill, 2007.p.35).  Hence, Kuwait was unable to defend itself against Iraq; it was 
compelled to request external support. Saudi Arabia took the responsibility to protect 
Kuwait through Saudi’s land. The Gulf States were powerless to support the Kuwaiti 
military because of one major fact. The GCC army lacked the trainings and skills to 
perform military operations. Even if they had, they would fail to confront with Iraqi army 
in terms of weapons and skills. Likewise, the lack of military experience affected the 
military since the region was not previously exposed to wars and this was a factor in 
weakening the GCC army. During the war with Iran, the GCC military assistance of 
providing army to Iraq was missing because the region was dependent on Iraq for 
protection, and therefore the army lacked the potential of development in defense and 
offensive force. Furthermore, military coups in the Arab states have contributed to the 
weakening of Kuwaiti army. The ousting of the Egyptian King Farouk in 1952 by a military 
coup and the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in 1958 in Iraq were incidents which 
affected the Kuwaiti royal family Al-Subah in being reluctant to the formation of a strong 
army (Terill, 2007.p.34).  
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The fear of being exposed to the same fate persuaded Kuwait to sustain a fragile 
military force rather than filling the vacuum of national defense with non-Kuwaiti citizens. 
In spite of the size and the strength of the Iraqi military forces, the forces were incapable 
of resisting the forces of the international coalition. James and Pardew argued Iraq 
miscalculated the ability of US coalition which led to the weakness of its military. The 
assumption of fragility of the coalition determined Iraq’s attitude. Iraq deeply assumed its 
small well equipped military was advanced enough, and therefore, capable of overcoming 
the coalition forces. As a result, this convinced Saddam that US would not intervene in the 
conflict. Moreover, the division of army forces was a second cause for failure of Iraq’s 
military.  The Republican Guards were the adequate army for Saddam authority. It was 
provided with high quality of equipment, received excellent trainings besides it symbolized 
the strength of Iraq. Despite their position in the defense in which they provided permission 
for the command of Iraq, the Republican Guard was never been used to bolster 
deterioration in Kuwait and was unable to defend Iraq from the operations of the coalition 
(James &Pardew, 1991.p. 21-22). 
 
 In contrast, the regular army was poorly trained to perform any defense. Several 
members of its units were members in the infantry division which were shaped by veterans 
and Iraqi civilians to build up an intense unit. This army depended on the units of artillery 
and infantry to overcome the barrier system regarding the lack of adequate quality of 
trainings and equipment to deal with operations (James &Pardew, 1991.p.21). Therefore, 
if the Iraqi army consisted of one huge division, including the Republican Guard with the 
regular army, it would strengthen the role of the army to compete with the coalition forces.  
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To sum up, Iraq’s military force has failed to defend its occupation of Kuwait. 
Recapturing Kuwait as Iraq’s 19th province would have been the road to Arab hegemony. 
Further, concentration on the political path succeeded to transform Saddam to an offensive 
leader. This was clear in two incidents, in 1980 the Iraq-Iran war and the invasion of Kuwait 
in 1990. In both wars, Iraq was the aggressor because it was the culprit in the outbreak of 
the two regional conflicts.    
 
4.5 Iran-GCC relations  
 
Iran’s position regarding the invasion of Kuwait was neutral. Nevertheless, it sided 
with Kuwait and supported UN sanctions against Iraq. Iran demanded immediate 
withdrawal of the Iraqi troops under no conditions or demands. As a consequence, Iran- 
GCC relations reached a new phase after the liberation of Kuwait. Moreover, to boost 
Iran’s political image with its neighboring states that are not allies, Hashemi Rafsanjani 
articulated three major factors in Iran’s policy with the Gulf States. Foremost, Iran’s 
intention was not to implement changes regarding the political map of the region; rather it 
sought to sustain the present geography. Moreover, Iran identified the US presence in the 
region as a source of balance of power. Eventually, Iran endeavored to restore its relations 
with the Gulf region in particular, Saudi Arabia as it is the leading regional country (Askari, 
2013 ).  
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To implement Iran’s policy, Kuwait was the first country to resume relations. Since 
Kuwait was the most affected state of the Iraqi invasion, Iran sought to humiliate Iraq 
indirectly through admitting Kuwait as a victim of Iraq.  Further, Iranian efforts to Kuwaiti 
citizens during the crisis helped to develop better relations. It supplied Kuwaitis with 
several forged Iranian passports including members of Al-Subah family to prevent the Iraqi 
forces from recognizing them while reaching exile in Saudi. Iran’s behavior resulted in 
Kuwait regression of opposing Iran in 1980-98 war (Lee, 2008.p.48) due to the realization 
of Kuwait that Iran was not the real threat, but rather Iraq. On the other hand, Iran’s main 
priority was to maintain a stable relation with Saudi Arabia. A local Iranian newspaper 
described Rafsanjani’s visit to Saudi in 1998 as an intention to establish a joint commission. 
Economically, both states agreed to settle the prices of oil after the prices declined to $12 
besides to set the concern of OPEC increased quota of 10% (Tehran Times, 1998).  
Politically speaking, Saudi Arabia guaranteed Rafsanjani that the presence of US bases in 
Saudi did not constitute a threat to Iran’s security. Therefore, to confirm the situation the 
bases shifted their location to Qatar (Al-Jazeera.com) to reflect Saudi’s peaceful aims.  
 
The theory of exporting the revolution was neglected in the presidency of 
Rafsanjani and Khatemi, as both focused on improving ties with the GCC. Since Khatami 
was calling for establishing mutual confidence and avoided hostility, Saudi announced in 
1998 at UN General Assembly that Iran was not a regional threat; yet it was a positive 
influence in promoting peace and preventing regional instability (Keynoush, 2016.p.147). 
  
Saudi realized Iran’s efforts in enhancing relations as new approach full of 
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optimism and free of tension.  The invasion of Kuwait made Saudi and the GCC states 
suspicious regarding the real threat. The outbreak of Iraq-Iran war had led the whole region 
to favor and assist Iraq due to the fear of exporting Iran’s revolution and overthrow the 
GCC regimes.  Thereby, after realizing the Iraq’s regional intentions, Saudi sought to 
justify its counter-stance. According to a journal of Law and Politics, it indicated that Saudi 
and its GCC neighbors had no alternative, the GCC states were compelled to support Iraq 
as an Arab state fighting in order to secure the regional peace. However, the Gulf was not 
intended to provide financial support to Iraq and the aid provided was for defense purpose 
(Amiri &Soltani, 2011.p.192).  
 
Regardless of Iran-GCC relations, Iran expressed reservation on the issue of UAE 
islands. It rejected negotiations, yet attempted to form agreement with UAE. A declaration 
of Iran published in 1999, issued the UAE islands did not constitute a matter of concern in 
UAE-Iran relations and both states were not willing to ruin their relations. (Keynoush, 
2016.p.147). Additionally, the islands were not a concern for Saudi. The Kingdom was not 
pleased to ruin the reconciliation with Iran because this was a turning point in the interest 
of both states. Otherwise, Saudi warned UAE not to bother Iran and encouraged it to accept 
the Iranian claims.  
 
Saudi and Iran rose as the major powers in the region, thus, both are factors in 
strengthening the regional stability or igniting it. Yet, each state demands to emerge as the 
solely regional hegemony. In the two regional wars 1980-1990, Saudi failed to play the 
role of hegemony. The fear of the Iranian revolution and Saddam’s aggression led Saudi to 
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abandon the concept of hegemony and sought to secure its national security. After the 
arrival of US in the region, the role of Saudi Arabia was boosted. Despite restoring 
relations, Saudi-Iranian interests contradict. After the Islamic Revolution, Iran sought to 
impose its power on the Gulf region and the Arab world. By implementing this, Saudi 
would fall under the hegemony of Iran. Hence, Saudi believed being dominated by Iran 
project transformation of the region would result in Shiite government by Iran and 
therefore, it influences the holy places of Mecca and Medina especially since the majority 
of GCC populations are Sunni.   Regardless of the intimate and stable Iran-GCC relations 
for a brief period, the relations worsened with the victory of Mahmood Ahmadinejad in the 
2003 election (Al-Dulaimi et al, 2017.p.92).  
 
4.6 Arrival of Iran as a serious sectarian threat to the region 
 
 
The US invasion of Iraq “Second Gulf War” in 2003 under the concept of “War on 
Terrorism” was a major cause for the escalation of tension in Iraq and the Gulf region.  The 
allegations of US against Iraq regarding the possession of weapons of mass destruction and 
links with Al-Qaeda were adequate accusations to overthrow the regime and establish a 
new government which would serve US interests. However, the failure of US to form that 
regime facilitated the gate for Iran to penetrate in Iraq’s domestic affairs and hence, Iran’s 
behavior in Iraq increased GCC threats assumptions. 
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4.6.1 The case of Iraq 
 
  The invasion of Iraq has shifted the balance of power and threat in the favor of Iran 
and hardly Iraq became the threat it was before.  Indeed, US fulfilled a limited role after 
the fall of Baghdad in Iran’s governance. US facilitated Iran’s intervention in the domestic 
affairs of Iraq. Hence, it was a golden opportunity for Iran to take advantage of the new 
Iraq and to assure that Iraq does not pose a threat to Iran. Moreover, it was argued that Iran 
supported the US invasion to limit Iraq’s threat to Iran. 
 
 The percentage of Shiite in Iraq increased after 2003, Shiite total percentage 
estimated 60% (Zweiri, 2009), In addition, Sunnis of Basra declined to 10% in contrast to 
35% before 2003, and were 85% of Sunnis located near Dyali province (Alrawi,2016). This 
indicates Iran’s major aim to make Iraq a follower of Iran. The Iraqi political vacuum was 
filled by Iran; from its viewpoint, Shiites have the greatest right to run Iraq’s affairs because 
their right was taken away by Sunni minority. Since 2003, Iran intervened in the politics 
of Iraq and succeeded to establish a government governed by Shiite. Politically, the winner 
participants were supported by Iran to win the elections, in addition most of Iraqi elites 
returned to Iraq from exile, according to Zweiri’s article. 
 
As a result, Iran established political ties with its Iraqi Shiite allies. The Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) founded in 1982 (Eisenstaedt et al, 2011.p.5) in Tehran, is 
the major ally of Iran. Its militia forces Badr organization received trainings from the 
Iranian IRGC and fought alongside Iran in 1980-8. The second major party is the Dawa 
party. It was established in 1950, this party was supported by Iran before taking place in 
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Iraq. Thirdly, the Sadary party is the most popular party in Iraq, it is anti-America; 
however, the party is against the concept of Velayet-Alfagih. (Eisenstaedt &Ali, 
2011.p.60). Lastly, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) has a close ties with Iran and 
provided support during the war with Iraq18.  
 
Despite the removal of Saddam and the emergence of new regime, the GCC 
perceived the Shiite and their presence in politics a threat. The assumption of Shiite as a 
source of danger was changed after 2003 and Shiite became an ally to US (Zweiri 
&Ehteshami, 2011.p.120).  This created a fear among the GCC because the shift of US 
perspective of Shiite will lead to empowering the role of Shiite in Baghdad and in the Gulf 
States. Furthermore, Iran’s intervention in Iraq is to achieve a certain objective. Weakening 
Iraq permits Iran to install friendly regime in Iraq. It leads to reliance on Iran in terms of 
politics. Thus, a Shiite dominated government and inserting Shiite politicians increases the 
level of sectarianism. Iran enviable to implement domination over the Iraqi’s militia19 to 
prevent the establishment of a Sunni power. The presence of Iran in Iraq creates 
opportunities for instability in the Gulf region. The escalation of sectarianism which Iraq 
transformed into a Shiite governed state, has awakened the sectarian sense of the Shiite 
community in the GCC, especially the Shiite in the GCC are restricted by the Gulf 
governments, they’re not allowed to occupy sensitive political positions. 
 
 Thus, Iran hoped to grow the role of Shiite through encouraging them to overthrow 
their regimes. Second, Iraq’s proximity to Kuwait led the region to be surrounded by two 
powers. In case of war outbreak, Kuwait and the GCC will be obliged to engage in a civil 
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war to secure the Sunnis.  In addition, religious influence in Iraq is a matter of concern. 
Iraqi Shiite cities became a place of worship Karbala, Najaf and Samarra, which promotes 
the values of these cities instead of Mecca. These Iraqi’s cities received Iranian pilgrims 
estimated to be around 1.2 million visitors to perform Haj (Eisenstaedt, 2015.p.6).   
 
Its looks like Iran’s intentions became obvious in Iraq. According to a report by 
examined the Iraqi’s responses regarding elections of Ahmadinejad. The report stated that 
17% of Iraqi Shiite assumed the Iranian president a positive leader while 43% believed that 
Iran’s interfering in Iraq’s domestic affairs is a negative sign (Guzansky, 2011.p.92). 
   
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Iraq was seeking to reshape its global political status after the war with Iran. Hence, 
the invasion of Kuwait was to compensate its massive loss through seizing the Kuwaiti oil 
to improve the status of Iraq’s economy by annexing Kuwait to Iraq. As a result of this 
aggression, Iraq transformed from a GCC ally into a GCC enemy. In contrast, dimensions 
concerning Iran have changed for better where the Gulf commenced to progress relations 
with the latter. However, after Iraq became a fragile state in 2003 due to the US invasion, 
Iran successfully managed to fill the power vacuum in Iraq. Since then, Iraq became a client 
of Iran in terms of political and religious aspects. 
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Chapter 5: IRAN AND ARAB SPRING 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The chapter will seek to examine the case of Iran and Arab Spring. In the first 
section, the chapter will pursue to investigate the issue of Bahrain’s uprising in 2011 and 
its consequences on Iran’s relations with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. Then, it will discuss 
the execution of the Saudi Shiite cleric and the responses of the Iranian and Saudi Shiite 
community. Finally, the second section aims to question the status of Iran’s involvement 
in the case Syria and Yemen.  
  
5.2 The case of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia 
 
The policy of GCC ally “US” after the events of Arab Spring in 2011 concentrated 
in assuring the Gulf States the continuation of US support to deter the threat of Iran (Nasur, 
2016.p.113). However, Saudi Arabia as the leader of the GCC was determined to control 
the situation alone.      
 
The Iranian-Saudi strife took place after the arrival of the new regime in Iran. The 
relation worsened in the aftermath of the revolution. Replacing the GCC monarchic regime 
with Velayet-Alfagih that is based on clerics performing politics escalated the tension 
because Saudi and Bahrain contains a large number of Shiite populations. After 2003, the 
Iranian-Saudi dispute was driven by the Shiite uprising in Bahrain in 2011 and the 
execution of a Saudi Shiite cleric.   
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5.2.1 Bahrain 
 
  Bahrain is the smallest state in the Gulf; it has always been affected by the Saudi-
Iranian hostility. The purpose is associated with the fact that the majority of Bahrain’s 
populations are Shiite, approximately 63%, (Zweiri, 2013.p.21) contrary to the rest of the 
Gulf. Based on Iran’s assumptions, Bahrain is a part of Iran and if annexed to Iran, Shiite 
in Bahrain would be pleased.  
 
Similar to Arab states e.g. Tunisia and Egypt, Bahrain was influenced by the so 
called Arab Spring. In February 14, 2011 uprising took place in Bahrain titled “Day of 
Rage” (Gengler, 2016) led by Shiite majority. The revolt was organized by youth protests 
requesting an immediate reform in Bahrain. The opponents were divided among Al-
wefaq20 Shiite organization and Al-HaQ movements. Dissimilar with the youth protests 
that called to topple Al-Khalifa regime in order to implement new alternative political 
system to improve Shiite status politically and socially. However, Al-Wefaq commands a 
constitutional reform. It initiated the concept of Bahrain’s political future under “Manama 
document,” that emphasizes on giving Shiite the right to participate in politics. 
(Kinninmont, 2012.p.3-7). Likewise, the Saudi Shiite backed Bahraini’s Shiite and claimed 
they must not be separated from the Sunnis and demanded equal rights (Jerges, 
2016.p.318). Indeed, Saudi perceived Bahrain’s incidents as a sectarian revolution 
sponsored by Iran (Bulter, 2011). The perception was resulted on the belief that Shiites are 
devoted to Iran and not to their countries, whereas Shiite in Bahrain follows Al-Sistani in 
Najaf (Mishal & Goldberg, 2015 .p.62) instead of velayet-Alfaqih.  
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To take control in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia deployed military forces from the 
peninsula Shield force upon the request of Bahrain (Ersoy, 2013.p.52). Because Saudi 
shares close relations with Al-Khalifa ruling family in Bahrain, the intervention was to 
safeguard the regime. Bahrain’s leadership conceives Iran as a threat even before the 
Islamic Revolution. Iran considered Bahrain belonged to Iran (Belfer, 2014). Further, Iran 
was blamed of 1981 coup in Bahrain. The Bahraini regime accused the Islamic Front of 
Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB) of attempting to overthrow the government under the support 
of Iran (Ivanhoe, 2012.p.125) .Therefore, the deployment of military forces was to ensure 
the continuation and the survival of Al-Khalifa regime (Mabron, 2012).  In addition, the 
factor of sectarianism creates instability for both states, in particular to Saudi. The 
Kingdom is concerned the Shiite political unrest in Bahrain will foster its Shiite minority 
to pursue similar actions against Al-Saud regime. In contrast to Bahrain, the authorities of 
Saudi imposed restrictions over Shiites in which Shiites are not permitted to establish a 
Shiite mosque (IBP, Inc, 2009.p.54) nor celebrate Shiite feasts in public, while in Bahrain 
Shiite enjoy full right to perform religious obligations. Similarly, the expansion of Iran’s 
influence in the region is a major obstacle. The fear of establishing a second Iraq in the 
Gulf increases Saudi-Iranian hostility. Consequently, Bahrain and Saudi suspect Iran of 
backing the uprising.  
 
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia charged Iran for intervening in the domestic affairs of 
other states. Iranian representatives, “media channels,” officials and clerics expressed their 
sympathy with the people in Bahrain. Iran views this case as a major Iranian case because 
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it belongs to oppressed Shiites (Kinninmont, 2012.p.20). As noted by Ali Baker, the Iranian 
media was responsible of increasing the confrontation between Iran and Bahrain. It 
supported the protestors via covering internal chaos of Bahrain. Baker also noted, the 
Iranian media commenced illusion campaign after the outbreak of the Arab Spring aiming 
to convince Iranian nationals that the Arab World is at the stage of “Islamic revolution” 
(Baker, 2012.p.94). However, Iran rejected the claims of supporting Bahraini protestors. 
The GCC states have always blamed Iran of creating regional instability. For the GCC, 
Iran is an anti-security state and it’s perceived as a source of meddling in the regional 
affairs and security, as clarified by Ersoy’s (Ersoy: 2013.p.53). No evidence was found to 
condemn Iran’s interference in Bahrain. Nonetheless, the GCC believed the evidence was 
the coverage of Iranian media of the uprising (Kinninmont, 2012.p.21). 
  
The Iranian-American writer Mahdi Khalji expressed that Iran was cautious in 
dealing with the issue despite criticizing Saudi Arabia of murdering Shiite protestors. The 
Iranian government sent two ships to Bahrain to support the dissident Shiite, yet it was 
forced to return based on Tehran’s orders. Thus, Iran’s behavior led the Shiite to question 
the degree of trust with Iran and whether Iran will provide support in the event of 
confrontation with the government (Khalji, 2011). 
 
 Indeed, Shiites in Bahrain were subjected to penalties upon the Uprising. Abolition 
of nationality was first implemented; around 260 Shiite became non Bahraini citizens after 
the revocation of their citizenship including Shiek Essa Qasem, the major Shiite religious 
figure in Bahrain (Ashto, 2016).This decision outraged Iran and considered it as a catalyst 
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for escalating sectarianism whereas Bahrain recognized it as the right punishment for 
instigators of Iran (Ashto, 2016).  
 
Bahrain is the battlefield of cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia and classified 
as a proxy war as both sides has different agenda’s to achieve. For Saudi, securing the 
Sunni based regime will strengthen the Sunni power over the Shiite. Bahrain receives 
political and financial support from Saudi in order to ensure the stability of its regime 
(Nuruzzaman, 2013.p.10), whereas Iran’s main intention is to defend the suppressed Shiite 
in the Gulf to obtain equal rights with Sunnis.  
 
5.2.3 Saudi Arabia 
 
  In Saudi Arabia, Shiite constitutes a minority and estimated 2,460,000 of the total 
population 26,939,584 in 2013 (Zweiri, 2013.p.20). Most of Saudi’s Shiite are located in 
specific areas in the Eastern province; Alqateef and Al-Ehsa. The majority of the Shiite 
follow the twelfth Imam doctrine (Al-Mezmah Studies and Research Center, 2017), similar 
to Iran. Eventually, Saudi-Iranian relation was unbalanced, however, it was based on 
friendship and understanding during Rafsanjani and Khatami presidency from 1990-2005. 
Ever after Ahmadinejad took over; the relationship has been hostile and worsened to its 
peak after the events of 9/11 and the US occupation of Iraq.  
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The Saudi-Iranian insecurity dilemma increased the rivalry among the two powers. 
Both Iran and Saudi are concerned regarding their internal security besides the issue of 
external threats play an important role in the states foreign policy. The case of Nimr Al-
Nimr is connected with Saudi’s domestic security. Al-Nimr was a Saudi Shiite cleric who 
became a well-known political and religious activist after his execution in January 2016. 
The authority of Saudi Arabia executed Al-Nimr upon several charges. The main charge 
was correlated with Saudi’s fear of potentials attempt of Shiite unrest in the Eastern 
province. Al-Nimr was known of being against the regime of Al-Suad. His political activity 
was a result of the discrimination treatment Saudi’s Shiite faced in a country based on 
Sunni majority21. Demonstrations of Shiite took place in 2011 calling for Shiite rights as 
Saudi’s citizens. According to Amnesty International (2016), these rights compromised of 
the right to establish Shiite mosques to perform religious obligations; the right to exercise 
religious occasions and Shiite schools to educate children about their sect. 
 
Second, Al-Nimr characterized himself as an ally of Iran. The Saudi cleric was 
receiving financial support and guidance from Iran. He declared his full support to Iran to 
intervene in Saudi Arabia to secure the Shiite. For Shiite, Al-Nimr was the savior of 
persecution (Fisher, 2016) and the Shiite voice that represent them. On the other hand, 
Saudi was concerned on Al-Nimr’s connection with Iran might increase Iran’s threat to the 
region; since protest of 2011 raised the fear of toppling the regime of Al-Saud (Townsend, 
2016).   
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From the Amnesty International perspective, Al-Nimr execution was an 
unacceptable behavior by the Saudi’s judiciary. The Amnesty argued the freedom of 
expression is a right for every individual and Al-Nimr must not be executed for practicing 
his right. The accusation of insurgent behavior against the ruler must not be considered a 
crime against the regime. In addition, the Amnesty blamed the authorities of categorizing 
the right of expression as a crime (Amnesty, 2016).  
    
Further, Al-Nimr case resulted in escalating the sectarian tension between Iran and 
Saudi where both states provoked serious responses. The day following the execution, riots 
and demonstrations broke out in Iran condemning the action of Saudi Arabia. As stated by 
Iran primer, Iranian protesters gathered in front of Saudi embassy in Tehran. Protestors 
broke inside the embassy and destroyed the building through smashing windows and 
setting fire (the Iran Primer, 2016). To vexed Saudi Arabia, Iranian authorities decided to 
rename the street located near the embassy of Saudi Arabia to ‘Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr’ 
street as an honor to Saudi’s Shiite and to undermine Al-Saud (ISNA, 2016). Nevertheless, 
President Rouhani expressed regrets for demonstrations and described the incident as 
negative image of Iran and that Iranians must not respond in that way (the Iran Primer, 
2016). Accordingly, Saudi’s response was similar to its previous behavior in similar cases, 
it cut-off ties with Iran and ordered Iranian officials to leave Riyadh in two days. Saudi’s 
assumed the Iranian protests as an attack against its internal affairs. The Guardian 
newspaper stated that Iran is incapable of transferring the Sunni state to a Shiite because 
the Kingdom will not pave the way for Iran (Chulov, 2016). 
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5.3Iran and its political intervention in Syria 
 
Since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil war, Iran and Saudi Arabia positioned 
themselves in depth in the Syrian crisis. The incident of Arab Spring in the Middle East 
and the weakness of several states, including Syria, encouraged Iran to penetrate intensely 
in the region’s politics. Moreover, Iran’s military intervention in Syria was a consequence 
of bilateral military agreement between both states in early 1980s (Zweiri, 2016). Hence, 
Iran successfully intervened via proxies e.g. Hezbollah and Militias groups in Syria22 to 
provide adequate support to preserve the continuation of Assad’s regime.    
 
Iran proxy in Syria is divided in two categories: the involvement of Hezbollah23 
and the foreign Shiite militias that have connections with Iran. These parties are paramount 
of the continuation of the Syrian crisis, especially the involvement the Lebanese militia of 
Hezbollah, founded in 1980 in Lebanon (Tokmajyan, 2014.p.105 ). Hezbollah’s seeks to 
protect Lebanon against Israel; accordingly the objective was achieved in 2006 when Israel 
launched a war against Lebanon. The intervention of Hezbollah in Syria in 2013 was due 
to maintain certain motives: first, the demand to protect the holy shrines of Shiite e.g. Saida 
Zaynab in addition to defend the Shiite cities and villages in Syria from the rebels 
(Tokmajyan, 2014.p.108). In the matter of religion sectarian duties, Hezbollah and Iran 
confirmed their support to the Syrian government (Al-Rabih, 2017). However, Hezbollah’s 
major objective was the survival of the Assad regime; as a result, the deployment of 
Hezbollah’s troop’s number in Syria is unspecified.  Based on The New York Times 
newspaper, around  8,000 of Hezbollah fighters were sent to Syria (Hubbard, 2017) 
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conversely, Washington Institute  reported the total number of fighters are 10,000 
(White,2014). 
 
 The alliance between the three axes, Iran, Syria and Hezbollah is classified under 
the concept of “Axis of Resistance”. Besides Hezbollah, Iran supplied the Syrian regime 
with foreign fighters “militias”, a large number of Lebanese and Iraqi militia fighters were 
involved in Syria under Iran’s appeal24. In addition, a year after the outbreak of the war, 
Iran boosted its support via the creation of a local Syrian militia called “National Defense 
Force” (NDF). The NDF received financial assistance from IRGC, trainings, military arms 
and weapons from Iran to fight along Hezbollah and other militias. Its members increased 
in 2015 to reach 40,000 (Orhan, 2015.p.7). Likewise, Iran managed to provide military 
trainings to around 150,000 soldiers of the Syrian regime in Iran 25(Hesse, 2015.p.5).This 
however, reflects Iranian military capabilities in protecting its interests. It is believed that 
Iran promoted the role of Jihad to the Shiite in Iraq, Lebanon and Iran under the aim of 
securing the holy shrines in Syria. Indeed, Iranian fighters involved in the battlefield as 48 
Iranians fighting in Syria captured by the Syrian rebels (Orhan,2015 .p.11).  
 
The factor of geographic proximity causes a concern to Iran. Since Syria is the sole 
Arab ally, the fall of Assad outcomes in the emergence of a hostile regime dominated by 
Sunni. Iran assumed the new regime in Syria is a threat to its interests in the region because 
the domination of Sunnis will not only lead to weaken Iran’s hegemony in Syria, but also 
weaken Iran’s proxy “Hezbollah” in Syria and Lebanon. Therefore, this contradicts the 
Iranian intentions. For Iran, Syria is the only gate to the Levant; so, the intention was not 
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to maintain the survival of Assad, but rather securing its influence, interests and expansion 
in Syria. This expansion paves Iran’s way to extend its hegemony to the Levant as the fall 
of Assad results in the fall of Syria under Iran’s occupation and transfer Syria into a Shiite 
fellow state similar to Iraq. Thus, Iran deployed its proxies to fulfill its interests under well-
prepared plans that even with the continuation or removal of Assad, these proxies will seek 
Iran’s assistance to prevent Sunnis reaching power (Rydell, 2017.p.21). Furthermore, 
gaining victory in Syria permits Iran to turn to Lebanon and enhance its support to 
Hezbollah regardless of its great influence in Lebanon.  
  
Coming to Saudi Arabia, for the first time it planned to contain and balance Iran 
with its GCC neighbors rather than relying on US despite US participation. Saudi Arabia 
managed to forge a coalition consisting of Arab States e.g. Jordan to deter Iran. The 
coalition members, particularly the Gulf States, adopted severe decision concluded in 
financing Sunni rebels to fight against Assad regime (Hokaym, 2011:2).  However, this 
contradicts the known behavior of Saudi, it demanded to remove Assad regime in Syria as 
a means to reduce Iran’s influence in Syria and weaken its extension of influence in the 
Gulf and Levant regions. (Berti &Guzansky, 2012.p.2).  
 
  Additionally, since the alliance of Assad with Iran created a concern for Saudi 
Arabia, it sought to support the Syrian rebels against the regime of Assad (Murad, 2017). 
The militia of Jaysh al-Islam26 is one of the funded rebellions by Saudi Kingdom. Further 
examples of Saudi’s intervention in Syria were mentioned in recent interviews by the 
previous Qatar prime minister, Sheik Hamad bin Jassim.  He clarified and confirmed that 
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Saudi Arabia has asked Qatar to intervene and support Syrian rebellions against Assad 
regime, and that is a vital fact that shows Saudi indirect intervention in Syrian crisis 
(Hamad bin Jassim, 2017). In addition to financing rebels, Saudi Arabia used the death 
row- inmates through decreasing their sentences to fight alongside rebels. A research study 
entitled “Syria: Iran’s and Saudi Arabia’s new playground?,” provided a data concerning 
the number of inmates. An estimated of 1239 inmates were involved in negotiations with 
Saudi regarding their participation in Syria. The negotiations compromised of delivering 
monthly financial aids to inmates’ families besides providing amnesty in exchange for 
receiving training and perform proxy fighting in Syria on behalf of the Kingdom (Rydell, 
2017.p.29).  
 
Another form of backing rebels is the hosting of international conferences titled 
“Friends of Syria” in Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco sponsored by Saudi Arabia. The aim 
of these initiatives is to strengthen the role of rebels to prevent their weakness in front of 
Iran and Hezbollah. The tyranny of Iran’s role in Syria impacted Saudi Arabia image in 
front of Arab and foreign allies. It causes increased in regional instability and demolishes 
GCC objective that erodes in limiting the Iranian expansion in the Arab region. However, 
even if Iran’s role in Syria is completed, a new ally will fill Iran’s vacuum “Russia”. Saudi, 
otherwise, is incapable of engaging in a war with Russia. First, without the assistance of 
US, Saudi will not be able to compete with the Russian military strength because unlike 
Saudi, Russia is considered as a weapons made state. Second, Saudi lacks the war 
experience and therefore, its role is confined with aiding rebels. 
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 Lastly, Saudi depends on support of US despite the absence of a direct involvement 
in Syria because US is involved in a cold war with Russia since the Soviet Union. Although 
the defeat of the Assad regime permits Saudi to emerge as the solely Sunni Arab power, it 
creates future concern. Supporting the Syrian rebels could threaten Saudi’s stability in the 
future with the rise of Muslim Brotherhood to power (Berti &Guzansky, 2012.p.3). Omer 
Kosh, a Syrian researcher argued that the events in the Arab region have increased the 
confrontation and the rivalry among Saudi Arabia and its opponent, Iran. For Saudi Arabia, 
it demands to preserve its internal stability and prohibits Iran from destabilizing the region, 
while Iran is concerned about its political status and influence in the Levant and Arab 
regions following the fall of Assad (Kosh, 2013).  
 
5.4 Iran’s involvement in Yemen “the closer the threat, the more direct it 
becomes”  
 
The regional security from the Gulf States’ viewpoint is Iran’s centric (Mansour, 
2016 .p.18).  Houthis in Yemen were not a threat to Saudi Arabia despite the clash with 
Saudis in 2009 after attacking the Kingdom’s borders. However, this changed after the 
Houthis allied with Iran that led to deepening Iran’s influence in Yemen (Al-Jazeera Center 
for Studies, 2015). To be specific; Iran’s support to Houthis persuaded Saudi Arabia to 
adopt immediate war to prevent the expansion of Houthis. Moreover, Saudi reformed its 
political path and therefore the Saudi war on Yemen was projected against Iran with the 
intention to compete over the hegemony of Yemen.  
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Iran-Saudi rivalry affected several Arab and GCC states27 to intervene in their 
proxy .The creation of a coalition titled “Decisive Storm” led by Saudi in 25 March 2015, 
where the GCC states besides the Arab countries are involved in the coalition except Oman. 
In addition, to stop Iran’s potential expansion in the region through the coalition with the 
allied states to contain Iran, Saudi deployed numerous military forces, ranged between of 
150, 000 fighters and 100 fighters jets (Dolgove, 2015), to fight the Houthi28 rebels. 
Nevertheless, the coalition was ineffective as Houthis successfully imposed a larger 
domination in Yemen (Popp, 2015:3).Hence, the GCC provided the Yemeni resistance 
with military trainings to prepare them to become involved in the fights while the militias 
positioned in the south of Yemen against the Houthis (Schmtiz,2017). Then again, Saudi’s 
effort was not enough to prevent the Houthis’ expansion, and it rather offered the Houthis 
more control over Yemen. In general Yemeni citizens are the only people who get affected 
by the war negatively; it didn’t rid them from the Houthis’ domination but instead helped 
the spread of poverty and diseases. The Yemeni crisis illustrates the success of Iran in 
backing Houthis to prevent a local resistance from establishing a new government. Further, 
it assumed a new government supported by a foreign power, limits Iran’s access to the 
region.  
 
In addition, Iran-Saudi proxy has a religious aspect; yet, the political factor 
overshadows since both states desire to perform political ambitions (Cote, 2017). 
Dominating a state close to its rivalry permits Iran to be close enough to the region specially 
its assumption on the Gulf as a part of Iran. Yemen is vital strategic interest for both 
rivalries because of the shared borders with Saudi Arabia. For Iran, similar to Syria, Yemen 
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is the key to extend its influence in the Gulf. Houthis are being used as a tool by Iran to 
promote its regional hegemony while for Saudi Arabia it’s attempting to expand its 
influence before the unification of north and south Yemen under one state. Saudi assumed 
its alliance via coalition states will facilitate Houthis defeat and therefore, Yemen will fall 
under its control. In addition, Saudi is taking advantage of the GCC states to extend its 
hegemonic role and participation in Yemen. In an online article published by Sputnik news, 
the former minister of foreign affairs Khalid Al-Atia declared that Qatar was forced to join 
the coalition (Al-Tufaili, 2017 ).  
 
In this regard, Iran’s operation in Yemen is to achieve a victory over regional strife 
and the rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Limiting the influence of Iran’s regional rivalry “Saudi 
Arabia” is permitting Iran to expand its influence and hegemony in Yemen. For that reason, 
Iran attempts to strengthen the role of its Yemeni ally “Houthis” in order to weaken GCC 
connections with Yemen and prevent Saudi’s and its regional allies from extending 
influence in Yemen (Al-Qadhi, 2017 .p.33). Furthermore, Al-Qadhi also argued that Iran’s 
failure to achieve its objectives results in causing domestic Yemeni strife full of chaos and 
dispersion which on the other hand empowers Iran for more influence (p.33).    
 
Proximity to Yemen impacted the political behavior of Saudi Arabia (mepc.org). 
Locating near a state plagued by ongoing political turmoil threatens Saudi Arabia’s 
stability.  The main threat revolves on the Iranian ideology of velayet Al-Fagih that might 
influence the Shiite minority, lead to overthrow Al-Saud regime and replace it with a client 
government to Iran. Likewise Saudi fears of a new hostile regime in Yemen, in other words, 
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a Shiite dominated government affiliated to Iran, similar to Iraq. This however, encourages 
the Shiite minority in Saudi to threaten Al-Saud legitimacy Sunni regime. Shiite 
government in Yemen will cause immediate concern to Saudi that the Yemeni revolution 
will expand into its borders predominantly after the uncertainty of Saudi’s strategy in 
Yemen that causes suspicious (Popp, 2015.p.3). The Kingdom desires to be encompassed 
by a cordial regime that endorses a foreign involvement (Kinninmont, 2016). Establishing 
friendly regimes allows the Saudis indirectly to control Yemen domestic affairs and 
transform Yemen into a follower state of Saudi.  
 
Using the literature Aldulaimi et al used in their paper, in this regard, Saudi 
acknowledged Iran’s attempt in extending its influence in both Iraq and Syria in addition 
to its influence over Yemen through its Houthis allies has convened Saudi that Iran could 
be considered as a source of regional instability (Al-Dulaimi et al, 2017 .p.98) due to its 
political behavior with its ally states. Therefore, Saudi is willing to minimize the Iranian 
influence, this would be achieved via bringing down Iran’s allies in Yemen, Syria and 
Lebanon. By this, the balance of power will be later in the favor of Saudi Arabia (p.98).    
 
The Middle East expert analyst Sigurd Neubauer, argued that the GCC states 
overstated the role of Iran in Yemen and its support to the Houthis. He advised the regional 
state to diminish their exaggeration and seek solutions to avoid Yemen from emerging as 
a geopolitical battleground between Iran and Saudi (Neubauer, 2015.p.2).  In addition, 
Iran’s indirect intervention via Houthi proxy provides an opportunity to Iran to victory a 
new ally in the Gulf in order to promote its hegemony. Achieving this will set fire in the 
 87 
 
region because it will facilitate Iran to implement its concept of extending revolution to the 
GCC through encouraging Shiite population to follow liberation revolutions.  The decision 
to be involved in Yemen’s internal affairs was made by Saudi (Al-Jazeera Center for 
Studies, 2015) aimed to restore the legitimate government of the Yemeni president Abed 
Rabbou Mansour Hadi (Fozia &Shazia, 2017.p.193). 
   
 
5.6 Conclusion 
  
The subject of Arab Spring among Saudi Arabia and Iran does not stem of settling 
disputes and bringing peace to the Arab world, however, it’s a case associated with regional 
rivalry. Saudi Arabia accused Iran of destabilizing Bahrain’s security via its indirect 
intervention despite Iran’s rejection of these claims. Indeed, Saudi Arabia’s action against 
Shiite minority regarding Al-Nimr led to increased sectarian tension and this is what Iran 
considered a challenge.  
 
Involving in Syria and Yemen, Iran attempts to take control of the most strategic 
states in the Gulf and Levant regions. With or without Al-Assad regime, Iran desires to 
transform Syria into a second version of Iraq whereas in Yemen, Iran’s intention from 
backing the Houthis is a kind of challenging Saudi Arabia through a victory in Yemen 
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Chapter 6: CONCLUSION 
 
This study is based on the presumption of the GCC that both Iran and Iraq are 
threats to regional instability. The researcher used Stephen Walt’s Threat Perception 
Theory to support the argument which emphasizes on the idea that states balance against 
threats and not state’s possession of power in addition to sources of threat consisting of: 
aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and offensive intentions. In 
this chapter, the research demonstrates the outcomes of the previous chapters for the 
purpose of providing conclusive findings.  
 
BOT theory is one of the most modern theories of the contemporary history. Walt’s 
theory is crucial to comprehend and to be examined in the political sphere of the Middle 
East region.  BOT is a unique among other theories, in particular BOP because Walt 
emphasized on states perception of threats rather than state’s capabilities where the 
decision to provoke alliance is driven by the level of threat perceived by others. Walt 
permits us to understand the motives that led the Gulf Cooperation Council States to 
classify several regional states as a factor of regional threat. In addition, the four sources 
of threat are significantly applicable to Iran and thus, the GCC alliances have been always 
against Iran. In contrast, Walt neglected the ideological aspect as unimportant element in 
the formation of alliance; yet, Iran-GCC strife does not reflect the concept of Walt.  
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Analyzing the findings related to the threat surrounding the Gulf region has been  
proved that the nature and the sources of threat have never been stabled, but rather were 
changeable based on the political environment surrounded the region through history. 
Indeed, the GCC sought uncalculated decision via their alliance with Iraq during the Iraq-
Iran war in 1980-88 without considering the alliance future outcomes which costed them 
un-predictable consequence in 1990.  
 
Moreover, Iran’s political behavior resulted from the animosity between the latter 
and the Gulf States. Since the advent of the external foreign power “US” to the Gulf, it was 
regarded as the major element in preserving the regional peace and security whereas Iran 
was excluded from the concept of regional security and was accused of destabilizing the 
Gulf States especially in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution and Khomeini’s 
statements against the GCC monarchs.     
 
Indeed, the geographical factor plays an essential role in influencing the nature of 
relation between Iran, Iraq and the GCC. The three Gulf wars, Iraq-Iran 1980-88, Kuwait 
invasion 190, US invasion 2003 in addition to the incident of Arab Spring created a matter 
of concern that the geographical map is subjected to change due to the rise of Iran’s 
hegemony in the Arab world . This, in contrast, resulted in a rivalry competition between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia where both states desire to seek hegemony and influence over states 
that experience internal strife e.g. Yemen and Syria. Meanwhile, without the anti-Iran 
alliance (GCC and US), the states of the region would not be safeguard nor defend 
themselves against Iran. This alliance is a vital factor in the survival of the Gulf region 
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which also prohibits Iran from interfering directly due to the presence of the US bases.  
 
Saudi Arabia and the small weak states are incapable of achieving victory over the 
Houthis in Yemen. The reason is mainly associated with the lack of military experience. 
The Kingdom recently invests heavily in the arms and weapons from US. However, these 
attempts do not reflect any positive results and Iran is still superior in the battlefield against 
the Arab coalition which made Iran to gain leverage in its proxy involvement in the Arab 
Spring.  
 
On that premise, not all the Gulf Cooperation Council States agreed on the 
assumption that Iran is the main threat to the region. Oman, for instance, maintained its 
neutrality regardless of its other GCC neighboring states’ status against Iran in the war of 
1980. Even more, Oman did not participate in the Arab coalition initiated by Saudi Arabia 
against Iran’s proxy in Yemen “Houthi”.  Moreover, recently, Qatar is following the exact 
path. After the political and economic blockade against Qatar by three of the GCC States 
(Bahrain, UAE and Saudi Arabia) last year of the month of June, Qatar sought to strengthen 
its relation with Iran at the political level. This however made Qatar, from the point of view 
of its neighbors, responsible for Iran’s political support in the region and that Qatar has 
accepted Iran’s influence in the Gulf. Taking all the above into account, this presents 
despite being one organization, few members do not accept the same claim.  
 
 
 
 91 
 
What is more, Qatar might search for a new ally as a substitute of America. It’s 
expected that this ally might heavily be Turkey due to the arrival of Turkish military forces 
to Qatar in addition to the Turkish political support provided to Qatar after the blockade.  
Turkey is the preferable candidate in terms of security concerns. As such, Turkey preferred 
Qatar over UAE and Saudi recently in the case of Muslim Brotherhood who assumed the 
Arab Spring as an opportunity to reemerge.  
 
This leads us to question whether Iran in the future run will form a military alliance 
with Qatar after its successful attempt in offering political support to Qatar against the 
blockade states? In case this took place, the Gulf would be two divisions, division one Iran, 
Qatar and Oman whereas the second is UAE, KSA and Bahrain and Kuwait would be 
neutral.  
 
Based on the contemporary events, it’s obvious that Iran-GCC strife will not be 
solved in the near future. All the parties are not willing to sit around the table to seek a 
mutual acceptance solution which on the other hand escalates tension and animosity. 
Despite that, even if a solution has been reached Iran will always be a source of suspicion 
and uncertainty.  
 
Eventually, since the thesis’s arguments and assumptions were based on the 
availability of the literature, the researcher suggested several future research 
recommendations.  Besides the other limitations mentioned earlier, the study requires a 
further and extended examination of the studied cases as some issues are still ongoing while 
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others are still pending e.g. occupied islands. Likewise, the recent Gulf crisis must be taken 
into consideration because it reflects a divergence in several GCC states (Qatar and Oman) 
assumptions towards Iran.  
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APPENDIX 
1 Theocracy is a form in which the country or the government is governed by an individual 
who relishing the religious prerogative to rule the country (gotquestions.org). The position 
of this individual is higher and important that the president of the country and he has the 
right to issue decisions related to the state. 
2 See, Stephen Walt, The Origin of Alliances p177-178. 
3 For details on his model see, Philosophical Papers, Volume 1: The Methodology of 
Scientific Research Programs http://strangebeautiful.com/other-texts/lakatos-meth-sci-
research-phil-papers-1.pdf 
4 See, Haq et al. Alliances in International politics: a comparative study of Kenneth Walt’z 
and Stephen Walt’s theories on Alliances.  
5 Al-Qawasim is a tribe ruled Sharjah and Ras-Alkhaima before the Federation of the 
Emirates. 
6 For full articles, see Priouz Mojtahedzadeh “Security and territoriality in the Persian Gulf: 
A maritime political geography”, p211. 
7 This statistics is approximation, calculated by the researcher, based on a report titled” The 
Elusive Quest for Gulf Security” by Khalaf Abdulhadi. 
8 For details statistical data, see GCC economics: UAE-Iran’s trade relations report. 30th 
July, 2015. SICO Research.  
9 See, Closing Time. Assessing the Iranian threat to Strait of Hurmuz, 2008 for specific 
details on thr Iranian equipments. 
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10 A statement said by the Shah of Iran Mehmet Reza Pahlavi in 1971 for the Guardian 
newspaper. For the full quotation , see Frauke, Heard-Bey” from Trucial States to United 
Arab Emirates. 
11 Persian Gulf is a term referred to the Arabian Gulf region, the term was used since the 
Persian Empire due to the Shahs believed that the Gulf region is considered a part of 
Persia’s territory. 
12 Sabti’s book was written during the Iraq-Iran war and published in few days after the 
decision of Security Council to end the war 
13 The Vice president of U.S 1980-1989 
14 See, Pursuant to Title V of the Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and 
Personnel Benefits Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-25).  
15 For details See, UN security council resolutions -1990. 
16 Million barrels per day. 
17 The last Shah of Iran before the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran that took 
place after the Islamic Revolution in 1979.  
18 For more information, see Eisendstadt, Iran and Iraq, and Eisendstadt and Ali, Iran’s 
influence in Iraq.  
19 The militia of Iran’s local parties e.g. Dawa party, Sadari and etc. 
20 See Zweiri and Zahid, the victory of Al-Wefaq: the rise of Shiite politics in Bahrain.  
21 See, urgent action Shiekh Nimr Al-Nimr executed, Amnesty International, January 2016.  
22 Iran and Syria share bilateral relation since 1979. Syria has supported Iran in the Iraq-
Iran war in 1980.  
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23 Hezbollah or the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon is a Shiite political and military group. 
Hezbollah is anti-Israel and US and is categorized as a terrorist group according to US. 
Similar to Iran, Hezbollah believes in Velayet Alfagih.   
24  See, Aaron hesse, Shiite foreign militias in Syria and Oytun Orhan the Shiite militias in 
Syria and political solutions p 8,9 and Aaron Hesse, Shiite foreign militias in Syria.  
25 See, Naame Shaam, Iran in Syria – From an Ally of the Regime to an Occupying Force, 
for provision of military assistance to the regime’s army.  
26 Coalition of Salafi and Islamists militia groups which are involved in the Syrian war. 
See , http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/533  
27 The countries are: Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and Morocco 
in addition to KSA. However, Qatar severs from the coalition in June 2017 after Bahrain, 
UAE and KSA broke diplomatic ties and accused Qatar for financing terrorism. 
28 Houthis is the common name for the movement of “ Ansar Allah”, founded in 1992.  It’s 
a political, religious and armed movement. The name attributed by its founder Hussain 
Baderddin Al-Houthi. See, Roland Popp, War in Yemen: Revolution and Saudi 
intervention.   
